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EXAMINING THE POWER OF FEDERAL COURTS
TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW
Jonathan Remy Nash t

Attracted by the perception that certification accords with norms offederalism and comity, federal courts have applied certification without serious
examination of its jurisdictional validity. Close examination of certification's jurisdictionalunderpinnings reveals that they are contradictory and
flawed. When a federal court certifies questions of law to a state court, the
proceduralposture is either that of the ftderal court temporarily relinquishing
jurisdiction over the case to the state high court-the "unitaryconception" of
certification; or that of the federal court abstainingpending resolution of an

independent, streamlined case by the state high court-the "binary conception" of certfication. The unitary conception is problematic because it may
require state courts to exercise the federal judicial power improperly. The
binary conception is problematic because it is inconsistent with current Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, although this precedential inconsistency
can be mitigated, the binary conception of certification remains inconsistent
with the fundamental purpose offederal diversity jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION

A federal court is frequently called upon to determine matters of
state law. In such situations, the federal court must divine how the
state's high court would decide the state law question at issue.' On
their own, federal courts can at best make only educated guesses as to
how a state high court would decide an issue of state law. 2 Thus, fedI See infra text accompanying notes 15-17.
2 For a discussion of the difficulties federal judges face in undertaking such inquiries, see Dolores K Sloviter, A FederalJudge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of
Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1675-77 (1992).
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eral courts have often ruled on issues of state law only to be "corrected" subsequently by state high courts."
Most state high courts now offer federal courts faced with questions of state law, as well as similarly situated state courts, the opportunity to "certify" those questions to the state high court. The state high
court returns to the certifying court answers to the certified questions.
With the issues of state law resolved, the certifying federal court presumably is then able to render judgment in the case in accordance
with properly interpreted state law.
Certification advances the interests of the states and their courts,
as well as the interests of the federal courts. 4 States are assured that
state law will be applied uniformly and in accordance with the interpretations given by each state's high court. State courts enjoy the benefit of having the final say on matters of state law. 5 Federal courts are
able to avoid the awkward, tenuous, and difficult chore of attempting
to determine how a state high court would rule on a matter of state
law. 6 Indeed, from the viewpoint of federalism, certification's salutary

effects are clear. 7 For this reason, certification has become increasingly popular since its inception half a century ago.8
-1 Compare, e.g., Md. Cas. Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987) (predicting
that, tinder Maryland law, costs incurred by cleaning up a site contaminated with hazardous wastes to comply with governing environmental law were not "damages" under the
language of a standard comprehensive general liability insurance policy), and Cont'l Ins.
Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985-87 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
[hereinafter NEPACCO], with Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1021
(Md. 1993) (holding that environmental cleanup costs did not constitute "damages," and
finding that the Fourth Circuit misperceived Maryland law in stating that "'the term "damages" imports a distinctively legal meaning in insurance matters"' (quoting Armco, 822 F.2d
at 1352)), and Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 510 (Mo. 1997)
(finding that the Eighth Circuit had misperceived Missouri law in NEPACCO, and holding
instead that environmental cleanup costs were "damages").
Such correction will likely do little for the parties to the earlier federal proceeding
once it becomes final. See, e.g., DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1272-75 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from a
previously entered judgment, which was based upon a federal court's prediction of state
law, was not available even though an intervening decision by the state high court explicitly
rejected the federal court's prediction of state law).
4 See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
5
See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
6 See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
7
See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
8 Florida enacted the first statute that contemplated certification of questions to its
supreme court in 1945. 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIcrr ET AL., FEDERAL PRAcrIcE AND PROCEDURE § 4248, at 160 (2d ed. 1988). The device was not used, however, until 1960. See id.
Today, most states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, provide (whether
through statute or court rule) authority for certification to their highest courts of questions
of state law by federal courts. See id. § 4248, at 167 n.3; infra note 71 and accompanying
text.
A more complete discussion of the historic development of certification is presented
at infra notes 50-73 and accompanying text.
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Notwithstanding certification's longstanding popularity and recognized benefits, the certification procedure raises serious questions
involving the scope of federal jurisdiction and judicial power. Rarely
have courts or legal commentators undertaken a serious examination
of these questions. In fact, it is somewhat difficult to make the case
that certification does not exceed the constitutional and statutory limits on federal jurisdiction. Even if it does not, at the very least certification is in tension with the fundamental purpose of federal diversity
jurisdiction.
Certification is subject to, and defenses to constitutional challenges to certification naturally rely upon, two competing and internally incompatible conceptions. The questionable jurisdictional
viability of certification has its origins in the incompatibility of these
two conceptions. First, the unitary conception applies when a federal
court that certifies a question to a state high court is understood to
transfer the very case that is before it (or some portion thereof) to the
state court. The state court considers and responds to the questions
of state law, whereupon the federal court regains control of the case.
Under this conception, there is one, unitary case, with jurisdiction
shifting from the federal court to the state court and then back to the
federal court.
Second, the binary conception, by analogy to typical federal court
abstention doctrine, applies when a federal court invokes certification
in order to abstain from exercising federal jurisdiction while the state
court, in a separate case under entirely state courtjurisdiction, considers the certified questions of state law. The state court closes its case
when it renders answers to the certified questions, and it is not until
this point that the federal court ends its abstention and resumes administering the case before it.
These two competing, and apparently inconsistent, conceptualizations of certification reveal a "duality" in the underlying assertions
of jurisdiction. 9 Certification's compatibility with constitutional and
9 Cf White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 668, 683 (Me. 1974) (referring to certification as embodying a "duality" of court involvement, while at the same time noting that certification
affords litigants "the benefit that both ... federal and state claims will be settled in the
substantial equivalent of a single lawsuit").
This duality is reminiscent of the duality physicists observe in the character of light.
Cf U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy,J., concurring)
("Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty.");
Mark R. Killenbeck, The Physics of Federalism, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (critiquing the
applicability ofJustice Kennedy's aphorism and stating that "[t] he founding was not.., an
instance of fission, . . . but rather fusion"). Physicists find it useful to conceive of light
either as a collection of individual particles, or "photons," of light, or as a wave of energy,
in order to explain different observable phenomena of light. See ELMER E. ANDERSON,
MODERN PHYSICs' AND QUANTUM MECHANICS 60 (1971); ALASTAIR I. M. RAE, QUANTUM
MECHANICS 8 (2d ed. 1986). For example, scientists rely on the "wave theory" of light to
explain diffraction. See ANDERSON, supzra, at 60; RAE, supra, at 8. By contrast, the particle or
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statutory limits on federal jurisdiction largely turns on the conception
of certification upon which one relies to justify the procedure. Moreover, different conceptions are better suited to answer different objections to certification. With respect to the federal constitution,
certification violates the Article III assignment of the federal judicial
power to the federal judiciary to the extent that state courts assert
jurisdiction as to cases properly before federal courts. Only resort to
the binary conception of certification avoids this constitutional
infringement.
Turning from the constitutional to the statutory basis for federal
court jurisdiction, certification is inconsistent with the statutory diversity jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts by Congress to the
extent that it improperly allows state courts to hear cases that fall
within the statutory grant. Unlike the constitutional issue, this problem is better addressed by the unitary conception of certification. The
unitary conception protects, at least somewhat, the notion that the
state law issues are resolved in the very case that is before the federal
court. Further, even though a state court may resolve those issues, it
does so pursuant tojurisdiction that is derivative of the federal court's
diversity jurisdiction. The binary conception can also be called upon
to resolve the problem. However, it provides only a superficial solution. It allows for compliance with governing Supreme Court prece"quantum theory" of light explains the photoelectric effect. See ANDERSON, supra, at 54-57;
DAVID PARK, INTRODUCI ION TO TIE QUANTUM THEORY 6-9 (3d ed. 1992); RAE, supra, at 2-3;
FRANZ SCHWABL, QUANTUM MECHANICS 5-6 (Ronald Kates trans., 2d ed. 1995). The applicability of these two facially dichotomous theories is said to demonstrate the dual nature of
light. See ANDERSON, supra, at 60; PARK, supra, at 9. In fact, "a duality similar to that which
we found for light waves also exists for the conventional particles of classical physics."
SCHWABL, supra, at 7. In this sense, matter can also be seen as exhibiting features of both
particles and waves. See PARK, supra, at 10-21.
The idea of looking to concepts of modern physics to enlighten and broaden our
understanding of the law is not novel. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and
the FunctionalApproach,35 COLUM . L. REV. 809, 827 (1935) (suggesting a "parallel between
the functional method of modern physics and the program of realistic jurisprudence");
Avner Levin, QuantumPhysics in PrivateLaw, 14 CANADIANJ.L. &JURISPRUDENCE 249 (2001);
Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvatureof ConstitutionalSpace: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern
Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989) ("[M]y conjecture is that the metaphors and intuitions that guide physicists can enrich our comprehension of social and legal issues."). See
generally Tribe, supra, at 3-4 (presenting historical examples of the influence of the sciences on legal development).
To the extent that the analogy to quantum physics is valid, this Article ultimately highlights the limits of applying descriptive devices, so useful in the field of physics, to the legal
landscape. Physicists rely on descriptive devices to explain phenomena beyond their control, that they do not fully understand. Often these descriptive devices appear facially inconsistent (such as the conceptions of light as both a wave and as a collection of particles),
again reflecting a lack of complete knowledge about the underlying phenomenon. Legal
procedures such as certification, by contrast, are not naturally occurring phenomena that
lie beyond the control of courts or beyond the recommendations of theoreticians. Thus,
the fact that applicable descriptive devices for a legal procedure appear facially inconsistent reflects a need for refinement of the underlying procedure.

2003]

FEDERAL COURT POWER TO CERTIFY

1677

dent, but it leaves unresolved the underlying, important policy issue of
whether allowing certification to proceed in pure diversity cases frustrates the purpose of the grant of diversity jurisdiction. Thus, only the
binary conception of certification interprets the procedure as consistent with the Constitution, while only the unitary conception of certification renders the procedure consistent with the letter and purpose
of the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction.
The existence of these two conceptions, with respect to the same
procedural device, is a problem for two reasons. First, application of
both conceptions to the certification procedure would lead to inconsistent legal rules. For example, application of the binary conception
of certification allows the state court the freedom to find facts, while
application of the unitary conception does not. Second, were certification subject to both conceptions, it would be the only procedural
setting in which that is the case. It seems clear that the two conceptions do not coexist with respect to other procedural devices. For example, it is clear that the unitary conception aptly describes the
appeal of a case from a trial court to an appellate court within one
jurisdiction and, moreover, that the appeal device is not susceptible to
description under the binary conception. It would be strange indeed
if certification were the only procedural device that bridged the gap
between two otherwise incompatible conceptions.
The inherent incompatibility of the binary and unitary conceptions denies certification its strongest defense against both constitutional and statute-based jurisdictional attack, thus leaving the binary
conception to offer the better, more consistent defense of certification
against both lines of attack. It insulates certification fully against constitutional attack and, with some changes to the governing certification jurisprudence, can allow for harmony between certification and
the letter of the federal diversity statute as interpreted by the Supreme
Court. However, application of the binary conception of certification
frustrates the goals underlying federal diversity jurisdiction, unless the
view that state high courts are far less likely than lower state courts to
discriminate against out-of-state residents is accepted. This is a thin
reed on which to peg certification's viability.
Federal courts often need to resolve undecided questions of state
law. Part I of this Article begins by discussing that need and by
describing how certification assists in meeting that need under our
federal system. It next presents an overview of the evolution and general features of certification. It also presents the costs and benefits
that commentators associate with certification. This Article assumes
the desirability of retaining the federal diversity jurisdiction-that on
balance, certification is generally desirable and, accordingly, that the
case for its viability is worth making.
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In Part II of this Article, the unitary and binary conceptions are
more fully described. First, the Article describes procedural devices
other than certification that clearly fall within the binary conception.
These devices are used to sketch the contours of the binary conception. The Article then performs a similar task for the unitary conception. Next, the Article demonstrates that certification, unlike other
procedural devices, is amenable to both the unitary and binary conceptions. Last, the Article explores the compatibility of the unitary
and binary conceptions and concludes that, while each conception
may describe different procedural doctrines and settings without conflict or tension, they cannot both apply-cannot, in other words, both
be "right"-with respect to the same procedural doctrine or setting.
Part III questions whether certification procedure is compatible
with the federal courts' constitutional and statutory jurisdiction. The
Article demonstrates that, to maintain certification against constitutional problems, it is necessary to rely upon a binary conception of
certification. In contrast, the Article recommends a unitary conception as the appropriate conception to address statutory concerns.
Note that there are options available to transform certification jurisprudence uniformly to a binary conception, such that certification
would still withstand the challenge that its exercise is inconsistent with
the diversity statute. The Article also demonstrates, however, that
these transformation options do little to address the inconsistency of
certification with the purposes underlying the diversity statute (if not
the letter of the statute itself), because there is insufficient basis to
believe that the binary conception of certification insulates out-of-state
litigants against bias by state courts.
I
THE ROLE OF CERTIFICATION IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

A proper evaluation of the validity of the binary and unitary conceptions of certification necessarily requires an understanding of the
details of certification procedure. This Part presents a summary of
the purpose, history, workings, and associated costs and benefits of
certification.
A.

Federalism and the Judiciary

Certification is designed to mitigate the problem of state courts'
inability to decide definitively issues of state law arising in cases heard
in federal court. The federal system"' at times calls upon state courts
10

See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971)
tance and implications of "Our Federalism").

(discussing the impor-
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to hear cases that raise issues of federal law,"I and upon federal courts
to hear cases that raise issues of state law. 12 To the extent that state
courts are called upon to determine matters of federal law, the United
States Supreme Court has the power to hear appeals from such determinations, 13 thereby affording it the opportunity to rectify erroneous
interpretations and to ensure uniform application of federal law. The
Court thus has the prerogative to be the final arbiter of disputes aris14
ing under federal law.
State high courts do not enjoy the same prerogative with respect
to state law. Under Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins,' 5 federal courts faced
with questions of state law are obligated to apply state law in the way,
as best it can determine, that the state high court would. 16 Accord11
State courts have inherent authority to hear federal civil claims; Congress divests
the state courts of such authority only where it explicitly confines jurisdiction over a particular sort of claim to the federal courts. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S.
820, 823 (1990).
12 Federal courts, by virtue of diversity jurisdiction, see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (2000), and supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000); United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), have the authority, and sometimes the
obligation, see infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (discussing Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943)), to hear certain matters arising purely under state civil law.
13
See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000).
14 The Supreme Court will hear an appeal from a state court case only when one of
the parties petitions for review. See id. Moreover, the Court accepts only a small fraction of
the petitions it receives each term. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE

164 (7th ed. 1993). Thus, in most cases, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of federal
law in name only. While the Supreme Court retains the prerogative to have the final word,
in practice, state courts can usually expect to have the final word on issues of federal law.
15 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16 Unless it can obtain a definitive statement of state law-whether through certification or abstention-the federal court must endeavor to divine, through an examination of
existing state law precedent, how the state high court would rule on the issue. See, e.g.,
Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967); Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 991
(4th Cir. 1994). Where the state law on point is not clear, the federal court "'must exhaustively dissect each piece of evidence thought to cast light on what the highest state court
would ultimately decide."' Sloviter, supra note 2, at 1676 (quoting HENRYJ. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 142 (1973)). See id. at 1675-77.

Bradford Clark identifies two approaches that federal courts use in determining how a
state supreme court would decide a currently unsettled or unclear issue of state law. See
Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism andJudicial Federalism
After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1495-1515, 1535-39 (1997). Under the "predictive
approach," the federal court "attempts to forecast the development of state law by asking
what rule of decision the state's highest court is likely to adopt in the future." Id. at 1497.
See generally id. at 1495-1515 (describing the predictive approach). Federal courts that
employ this approach may recognize new causes of action, see id. at 1502-03, as well as
novel defenses, see id. at 1508-10. By contrast, under the "static approach," federal courts
will "adjudicate the rights and duties of the parties without regard to novel rules proposed
by the parties, but not yet recognized authoritatively by an appropriate organ of the state."
Id. at 1537. See generally id. at 1535-39 (describing the static approach).
Michael Dorf identifies three methods, one predictive and two nonpredictive, by
which federal courts might ascertain a governing rule of state law. See Michael C. Doff,
Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 661-71 (1995). Under the prediction
model, a federal court would endeavor to determine exactly how thejudges of the relevant
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ingly, it is often said a state's highest court is the definitive authority of
the law of that state,' 7 much as the United States Supreme Court is the
definitive authority of federal law. This statement, however, may be
somewhat misleading because, unlike the United States Supreme
Court, state high courts often do not enjoy the right to rule definitively in all cases involving state law. Indeed, in most federal court
cases involving issues of state law, no state court has any opportunity
to rule upon the state law questions at issue.'I
Certification provides some remedy to state high courts in that it
gives them the opportunity to provide definitive interpretations on
matters of state law in federal court cases. It is the most common
method affording states such an opportunity. Under certification procedure, a federal court "certifies" to a state's high court a question or
questions of state law with which it is faced and upon which it would
like the state court to rule. - The state court then responds to the
question if it wishes.
state high court would resolve the issue. See id. at 661-64. Under the execution model, the
federal court would "execute the law as found in already decided cases, but not ... craft
novel interpretations." Id. at 664 (footnote omitted). See generally id. at 664-65 (describing
the execution model). In contrast, the elaboration model affords the federal court far
more freedom. Although the federal court cannot overrule existing decisions of the state
high court, it "will have at its disposal all of the legal tools that the high court has." Id. at
666; see id. at 665-66 (describing the elaboration model). Doff argues against the use of
the prediction model, both as a general matter, see id. at 679-89, and in particular in diversity cases, see id. at 695-715.
17 See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) ("This Court... repeatedly
held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law ...." (citations omitted));
Nemours Found. v. Manganaro Corp., 878 F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Patently [a state
high] court is the final arbiter of that state's law."); Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 561 F.2d 1178,
1194 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he Supreme Court of Louisiana is the final expositor of Louisiana law .. ");Tarr v. Manchester Ins. Corp., 544 F.2d 14, 14 (1st Cir. 1976) (A federal
court cannot "'correct' a state court's interpretation of its own law." (citation omitted)).
In rare cases, the Supreme Court may review a state court determination of state law
where the state law issue is antecedent to an issue of federal law. See generally Laura S.
Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-Law Judgments, 101
Micii. L. REV. 80 (2002) (discussing the precedent behind and justifications of Supreme
Court review of state court, state law decisions).
18 One commentator accuses the federal diversity jurisdiction, as the prime culprit for
this state of affairs, of "siphoning away the opportunity to resolve cases at the state level
that would enrich and refine the body of state law to which federal and state judges could
refer with confidence." L. Lynn Hogue, Law in a Parallel Universe: Erie 's Betrayal, Diversity
Jurisdiction, Georgia Conflict of Laws Questions in Contracts Cases in the Eleventh Circuit, and
Certification Reform, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 531, 532 (1995).
Theoretically, it is possible for states to create an opportunity for a state court to decide issues of law that arise in federal court cases: The state could authorize a specialized
tribunal charged with reviewing the dockets of federal courts to determine cases in which
questions of state law-or, more practically, important and undecided questions of state
law-might arise. The tribunal could in theory render decisions on the state law issues
that, under Erie, the federal courts would be obligated to follow. See infra note 259.
19 State laws vary as to which federal courts are authorized to certify questions to the
state high court. See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4248, at 167-68 & nn.31-32. In

addition, some states permit courts of other states to certify questions of state law to the
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Evolution of Pullman Abstention and Certification

Today, certification is the primary method by which federal
courts faced with undecided questions of state law are able to enlist
the aid of state courts to resolve those questions. Before the rise of
certification, however, federal courts looked to Pullman abstention as
a means to elicit the assistance of state courts. 211 This section presents
a brief review of the history of Pullman abstention. This review focuses
on two cases: Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. 2 1 and Meredith v. Winter Haven.2 2 It then examines the rise of certification, and explains
how certification has moved beyond the moorings and limitations that
still restrict Pullman abstention.
1. History of Pullman Abstention
In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., the Supreme Court held
that, under certain limited circumstances, it is appropriate for a federal court, faced with a case raising issues of state law, to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction over the case either altogether or pending state
court resolution of the state law issues. 23 The Court in Pullman considered challenges, based on state law and the federal constitution, to
a Texas Railroad Commission order. The Supreme Court agreed with
the three-judge district court's decision to turn first to the state law
claims, since a determination that the Commission acted in violation
of state law would terminate the case and, therefore, obviate any need
to address the federal constitutional issues. 24 Nonetheless, the Court
state high court. See 17A id. § 4248, at 168 & n.33. Concerns analogous to those addressed
herein might be raised where the court of one state certifies questions of law to the high
court of another state. A discussion of such concerns, however, lies beyond the scope of
this Article.
For a discussion of the jurisprudential implications of certification, see generally Paul
A. LeBel, Legal Positivism and Federalism: The Certification Experience, 19 GA. L. REv. 999
(1985) (arguing that certification is consistent with a legal positivist conception of law). Cf
Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REv. 673
(1998) (arguing that Erie's commitment to legal positivism is conceptually and normatively
independent of its constitutional holding).
20
SeeJohn B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, InterjurisdictionalCertificationand Choice of Law, 41
VAND. L. REV. 411, 416 (1988) ("In many respects, certification is an outgrowth of the
[Pullman] abstention era."); see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,
75 (1997) ("Certification today covers territory once dominated by a deferral device called
'Pullman abstention,' .... "); Bruce M. Selya, Certfied Madness: Ask a Silly Question .... 29
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 677, 688 n.41 (1995) ("[O]nly Pullman abstention implicates the certification process."). While the Supreme Court has recognized limited forms of "Erie abstention"-when a federal court abstains from a federal diversity case that raises no issue of
federal law pending resolution of a state case that resolves the governing state law questions-the scope of Erie abstention is quite circumscribed. See Clark, supra note 16, at
1517-24; infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
21
312 U.S. 496 (1941).
22 320 U.S. 228 (1943) (limiting the applicability of Pullman abstention).
23 See 312 U.S. at 499-501.
24 See id. at 498.
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reversed the district court's judgment on the ground that, instead of
ruling on the state law claims, the trial court should have abstained
from moving forward in the case until a proceeding to determine the
25
matters of state law was litigated in the Texas state courts.
Pullman abstention doctrine, as it has evolved, applies when a federal court is faced with undecided questions of federal constitutional
and state law, and determination of the state law questions likely
would obviate the need to address important and undecided federal
constitutional questions.2 6 Soon after Pullman, the question arose as
to whether the doctrine extended to cases where a federal court is
faced with undecided, solely state law questions. This question was

answered in Meredith v. Winter Haven.
Meredith v. Winter Haven originated as a diversity action in federal
district court in Florida. 27 Examining the district court's dismissal of
the case on the merits, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found that the governing law of Florida-was unclear. Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Pullman, the court of appeals directed the district court to abstain from further action until
the Florida state courts resolved the relevant questions of Florida
law. 28 The Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that the governing Florida law was unresolved, 29 but nonetheless rejected the proposed application of Pullman abstention. Speaking through Chief
Justice Stone, the Court explained:
[T] he difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter
determine the state law to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly brought to it for decision.
The diversity jurisdiction was not conferred for the benefit of
the federal courts or to serve their convenience. Its purpose was
generally to afford to suitors an opportunity in such cases, at their
option, to assert their rights in the federal rather than in the state
courts. In the absence of some recognized public policy or defined
principle guiding the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred, which
would in exceptional cases warrant its non-exercise, it has from the
first been deemed to be the duty of the federal courts, if theirjurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide questions of state law whenever necessary to the rendition of a judgment. When such
exceptional circumstances are not present, denial of that opportu25
26

See id. at 501-02.
See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4242, at 30 (describing the application of
Pullman abstention to cases raising constitutional questions).
27 See 320 U.S. at 229.
28

See id. at

231.

29 See id. at 232-35. The Court also agreed that at least one of the state law issues
presented, "so far as appearted], [had] not been passed upon by the Florida courts." Id. at
232.
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nity by the federal courts merely because the answers to the ques-

tions of state law are difficult or uncertain or have not yet been
given by the highest court of the state, would thwart the purpose of
the jurisdictional act.30
Finding no such equitable circumstances present, 3 t the Court con3 -2
cluded that abstention was inappropriate.
Meredith's prohibition against the use of Pullman abstention
where an unclear issue of state law is presented in a pure diversity case
remains valid today.3 3 While the Supreme Court has endorsed the use
30

Id. at 234-35 (citations omitted).

One of the equitable grounds that might justify abstention identified by the Meredith Court but not found in Meredith itself, was the "salutary policy," enunciated in Pullman,
31

"of refraining from the unnecessary decision of constitutional questions." Id. at 236.
32
The Court further elaborated:
Congress having adopted the policy of opening the federal courts to suitors
in all diversity cases involving the jurisdictional amount, we can discern in
its action no recognition of a policy which would exclude cases from the
jurisdiction merely because they involve state law or because the law is uncertain or difficult to determine. The decision of this case is concerned
solely with the extent of the liability of the city on its Refunding Bonds.

Decision here does not require the federal court to determine or shape
state policy governing administrative agencies. It entails no interference
with such agencies or with the state courts. No litigation is pending in the
state courts in which the questions here presented could be decided. We
are pointed to no public policy or interest which would be served by withholding from petitioners the benefit of the jurisdiction which Congress has
created with the purpose that it should be availed of and exercised subject
only to such limitations as traditionallyjustify courts in declining to exercise
the jurisdiction which they possess. To remit the parties to the state courts
is to delay further the disposition of the litigation which has been pending
for more than two years and which is now ready for decision. It is to penalize petitioners for resorting to a jurisdiction which they were entitled to

invoke, in the absence of any special circumstances which would warrant a
refusal to exercise it.
Id. at 236-37.
33
See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4246, at 106 ("The leading case was-and
except where the special procedure of certification is involved probably still is-Meredith
v. City of Winter Haven." (footnotes omitted)); 17A id. § 4246, at 111 ("There are a few...
cases ... in which [lower] federal courts have abstained merely because a state law question was difficult but those cases are exceptional. Most courts when confronted with the
issue have held that the difficulty of determining state law is not in itself sufficient ground
for abstention." (footnotes omitted)). See generally 17A id. § 4246 (discussing abstention
doctrines and the resolution of unsettled questions of state law).
In contrast to the Supreme Court's emphatic rejection of Pullman abstention solely to
allow resolution of unclear issues of state law in Meredith, the Court was more equivocal in
addressing whether Pullman abstention might be justified where resolution of an issue of

state law might obviate the need for the federal court to resolve an unclear issue of federal
statutory (as opposed to constitutional) law. In Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949), the

petitioner (in an argument raised for the first time in his Supreme Court briefs) asked the
Court to remand the case to the federal district court with instructions that the district
court abstain pending, resolution of a state law issue by the state courts of New York because resolution of the state law issue might obviate the need to resolve a federal nonconstitutional issue. Id. at 482-88. Without rejecting the possibility of abstention in any such
setting, the Court explained that generally "[wihere a case involves a nonconstitutional
federal issue . . . . the necessity for deciding which depends upon the decision on an
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of this so-called "Erie-based abstention"3 4 in a few pure diversity cases,
it has continued to stress that the use of abstention in such cases is the
exception rather than the rule. In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City
of Thibodaux,35 the Supreme Court recognized the discretionary authority of a federal district court to stay federal proceedings pending
resolution of a question of state eminent domain law by the Louisiana
Supreme Court.3 6 The Court, however, limited the scope of its holding by stressing that the "special nature" 37 of eminent domain-"it is
intimately involved with sovereign prerogative"3 8 -'justifies" a federal
court's power to "ascertain" an interpretation of state law from the
4
state court system.3 9 Similarly, in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S. Ranch Co., 0
the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's denial of a stay pending resolution of a state court declaratory judgment suit that would address the
pertinent state constitutional question. 4' The Court rested its decision on the ground that the state law issue-whether the state constitutional provision regarding compensation for property taken for
"public use" applied where a state statute authorized one party to tresunderlying issue of state law, the practice in federal courts has been, when necessary, to
decide both issues." Id. at 490. The Court then concluded that abstention was improper in
the case before it: "We reject the suggestion that a decision in this case in the federal courts
should be delayed until the courts of New York have settled the issue of state law." Id. at
492. Some commentators read Propperto preclude abstention based solely on the ground
that resolution of a state law issue might obviate the need for the federal court to decide a
novel question of nonconstitutional federal law. See Charles L. Gowen & William H. Wlar,
Jr., Federal Court Abstention in Diversity of Citizenship Litigation, 43 TEX. L. REV. 194, 212-13
(1964).
34
See Clark, supra note 16, at 1517-24.
35 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
36
See id. at 26-27.
37
Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
318
39
See id. at 29. In a footnote, the Court distinguished Meredith on potentially broader
grounds:
Here the issue is whether an experienced district judge, especially conversant with Louisiana law, who, when troubled with the construction which
Louisiana courts may give to a Louisiana statute, himself initiates the taking
of appropriate measures for securing construction of this doubtful and unsettled statute (and not at all in response to any alleged attempt by petitioner to delay a decision by that judge), should be Jurisdictionally disabled
from seeking the controlling light of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The
issue in Winter Haven was not that. It was whether jurisdiction must be surrendered to the state court.
Id. at 27 n.2 (emphases added). Nonetheless, the Court's subsequent language in the text
of its opinion, supra note 37 and accompanying text, and reaffirmance of Meredith in later
cases, infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text, confirm the narrow reading of Thibodaux
and the continued general vitality of Meredith. As one leading treatise explains, Thibodaux
can be justified without disturbing Meredith on the ground that "the special nature of eminent domain proceedings, combined with difficulties in ascertaining state law, will permit
abstention even though neither of the circumstances individually would suffice." 17A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4246, at 107 (footnote omitted).
40
391 U.S. 593 (1968) (per curiam).
41
See id. at 594.
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pass on another party's property in order to use water rights granted
by the state-was "one of vital concern in the arid State of New Mex'42
ico, where water is one of the most valuable natural resources.
While the Court has recognized limited exceptions to the Meredith rule in Thibodaux and Kaiser Steel Corp., it has never overruled Meredith.43 To the contrary, the Court has continued to cite the case
favorably. For example, in Lehman Bros. v. Schein,44 the Court reaffirmed Meredith's continuing validity in diversity cases where Pullman
abstention is under consideration. The Court stated that Meredith
"teaches that the mere difficulty in ascertaining local law is no excuse
for remitting the parties to a state tribunal for the start of another
lawsuit. '4 5 Two years later, in Colorado River Water ConservationDistrict
v. United States,46 the Court decided that a federal district court lacked
discretion under Pullman to abstain from hearing a case involving the
allocation of water rights under state law. 47 The Court distinguished
Thibodaux on the ground that "[n] o questions bearing on state policy
are presented for decision," 48 and again referred favorably to Meredith
for the proposition that "the mere potential for conflict in the results
42
Id. at 593-94. Justice Brennan's concurrence, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, emphasized that the special nature of the state law question alone justified the
Court's decision:

I concur solely on the ground that this case presents one of the "narrowly
limited 'special circumstances"' which justify the invocation of"[t]hejudgemade doctrine of abstention" .
The "special circumstances," as the
Court states, arise from the fact that "[t]he state law issue which is crucial in
this case is one of vital concern in the arid State of New Mexico, where
water is one of the most valuable natural resources."
Id. at 594-95 (citations omitted) (quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967), and
Kaiser, 391 U.S. at 595 (majority opinion)).
43
One leading federal jurisdictional resource notes that the Court has applied Pullman in diversity cases, citing for this proposition Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 363 U.S.
207 (1960), United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962) (per curiam),
and Fornarisv. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970) (per curiam). RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET
AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1236 (4th ed.
1996). In Clay, however, as discussed below, see infra text accompanying note 54, the Court
remanded the case with the expectation that the court of appeals would employ certification, not Pullman abstention. And, while Clay, United Gas Pipe Line and Fornaris were
brought as diversity cases, the courts of appeals in each case held that pertinent statutes
were unconstitutional, thus introducing a federal constitutional issue into the mix. See
Fornaris, 400 U.S. at 42; United Gas Pipe Line, 369 U.S. at 135; see in/ra text accompanying
note 52. Thus, while the Court has applied Pullman abstention in cases brought initially
under the diversity grant, it has done so only in cases that, on appeal, are circumstantially
similar to Pullman. Such a result is entirely consistent with Meredith.
44
416 U.S. 386 (1974).
45
Id. at 390.
46
424 U.S. 800 (1976).
47
See id. at 813-17. "Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule." Id. at 813.
48
Id. at 815.

1686

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:1672

of adjudications, does not, without more, warrant staying exercise of
' 49
federal jurisdiction.
2.

History of Certification

The cumbersome Pullman abstention procedure remained for
two decades the primary vehicle by which federal courts could avoid
deciding federal constitutional questions by enlisting the state courts
to resolve undecided questions of state law. However, the dominance
of Pullman abstention ended with the rise of certification in the 1960s.
The first case in which certification was used, Clay v. Sun Insurance
Office Ltd. ,5 involved circumstances akin to those presented in Pullman.5 1 Clay itself was a diversity case, but a federal constitutional question arose when the Fifth Circuit ruled that a Florida statute-which
rendered contractual provisions, purporting to limit the time in which
lawsuits arising out of contracts could be brought, unenforceablecould not be applied to out-of-state contracts as a matter of due pro-

cess. 5 2 In an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court chastised the Fifth Circuit for having reached this constitutional question
without first considering whether, as a matter of state law, the Florida
statute applied to the contract at issue.5-3 Further, the Supreme Court,
although it stopped short of certifying state law questions to the Florida Supreme Court itself, strongly suggested that the Fifth Circuit avail
itself of the procedure on remand. 5 4 The Fifth Circuit followed this
49 Id. at 816.
Although the Court concluded that none of the standard bases for abstention were
applicable, it ultimately held that the federal district court properly dismissed the case in
favor of a pending state court proceeding. See id. at 817-21. Some commentators refer to
Colorado River as having given rise to a new form of abstention. See, e.g., 17A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 8, § 4241, at 27, 29 (noting that the Supreme Court in Colorado River "was unwilling to call it abstention," but employing the terminology "abstention to avoid duplicative
litigation, now frequently referred to as Colorado River-type abstention"). The fact remains, however, that Colorado River is consistent with both Pullman and Meredith.
50
363 U.S. 207 (1960), on remand to Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505, 512
(5th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
51
In their treatise, FederalPracticeand Procedure,Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller,
and Edward H. Cooper explain:
Although this case went beyond the situations in which the Court had previously ordered Pullman-type abstention, in that it was an action at law between private parties, the reasons for Pullman-type abstention applied to it
fully. Interpretation of the state statute might avoid the need to decide a
federal constitutional question and an interpretation of the statute'by the
federal court would have been only a forecast rather than an authoritative
determination of what the statute meant. Thus, it would not have been
surprising if Pullman-type abstention had been ordered.
17A WRIlGH Er AL., supra note 8, § 4248, at 160.
52
Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522, 527-28 (5th Cir. 1959), vacated by 363
U.S. 207 (1960).
53
See Clay, 363 U.S. at 209-10.
54
d. at 212. Florida had enacted a statute that contemplated certification of questions to its supreme court-the first such statute in the nation, Clark, supra note 16, at 1553
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suggestion on remand. 55 Notably, Justice Frankfurter's opinion in
Clay did not address the applicability of the Court's Pullman abstention jurisprudence. 5 6 Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion, however,
relied on and quoted from Meredith, and concluded that "[t] he parties
are entitled-absent unique and rare situations-to adjudication of
5- 7
their rights in the tribunals which Congress has empowered to act.
Shortly after Clay, in Green v. American Tobacco Co., 58 an appeal of

a diversity case 59 that raised no issue of federal law, the Fifth Circuit
certified questions of law to the Florida Supreme Court.60 The opinion made no mention of the Pullman abstention doctrine, Meredith, or
the argument raised by Justice Douglas's dissent in Clay.
Four terms after Clay, the Supreme Court itself certified questions
of law to the Florida Supreme Court in two cases, Dresner v. City of
Tallahassee6 1 and Aldrich v. Aldrich.62 Both cases were appeals from
state supreme courts and, as such, did not fit squarely into the Pullman
model. Further, the Court's use of certification was not motivated
solely by a desire to obtain a definitive answer to an unresolved ques-

n.502-in 1945. 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4248, at 160. The Court in Clay recommended that the Fifth Circuit employ certification despite the fact that the Florida Supreme Court had not yet adopted rules that would have implemented the procedure. See
id. at 161.
55
In response to the Fifth Circuit's certification, the Florida Supreme Court held that
the statute at issue did indeed apply to the contract at issue. Now forced to readdress the
constitutional issue it had previously addressed, the Fifth Circuit issued a new opinion
adhering to its original view. See Clay, 319 F.2d at 512. The case again went up to the
United States Supreme Court, which unanimously reversed the Fifth Circuit's disposition.
See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 183 (1964). This first foray into certification,
which the Supreme Court's original opinion in the case viewed so optimistically, thus ended with a note of irony in that "four years after certification had first been ordered," the
Supreme Court "affirmed the judgment ... in favor of the insured that the district court
had entered long before." 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4248, at 162 (footnote
omitted).
56
See 363 U.S. 207. In fact, the Clay majority opinion includes only an oblique reference to Meredith, citing it with a "see alsd' signal for the proposition that, "[e]ven without
such a facilitating statute we have frequently deemed it appropriate, where a federal constitutional question might be mooted thereby, to secure an authoritative state court's determination of an unresolved question of its local law." Id. at 212 (citing Meredith v. Winter
Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943)). The Meredith opinion includes references to numerous
cases, including Pullman, in which the Court deferred to state court determinations of state
law, see 320 U.S. at 236, although the Meredith Court ultimately determined that none of
those cases was applicable in the case then before it, id.
57
363 U.S. at 228 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58
304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964).
Id. at 77 (granting petition for rehearing per curiam).
Id. (granting petition for rehearing per curiam).
61
375 U.S. 136 (1963).
62
375 U.S. 249 (1963); see also Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75, 75 (1963) (announcing
the intention to certify questions to the Supreme Court of Florida).
59

60
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tion of state law in either case. In other words, the use of certification
63
in these cases was not consistent with the rule of Meredith.
The Supreme Court gave its express approval to the use of certification in pure diversity cases that raise no federal question in Lehman
Bros. v. Schein.64 The Schein Court praised certification, explaining
that "[i]t does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and re-

sources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism.

'65

The

Court suggested that Pullman abstention would be inappropriate in
the pure diversity case before it, noting that Meredith "teaches that the
mere difficulty in ascertaining local law is no excuse for remitting the
parties to a state tribunal for the start of another lawsuit. ''66 Implicitly
distinguishing certification from abstention, the Court proceeded to
note that certification was "particularly appropriate in view of the nov63

Aldrich reached the United States Supreme Court on the question of whether the

state courts of West Virginia had violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONsT. art.
IV, § 1, by refusing to enforce a divorce decree issued by a Florida state court. 375 U.S. at
251. The Court certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court relating to the propriety
of the Florida divorce decree, the subject matter jurisdiction of the court that issued the
decree, and how the decree, if improper, might be challenged. 375 U.S. at 75-76. The
answer to these certified questions would affect the Court's federal constitutional analysis.
See Aldrich v. Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540, 543 (1964) (basing the holding that West Virginia did
violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause on the answers (provided by the Florida Supreme
Court) to the certified questions).
In Dresner, the Court was unsure whether it had jurisdiction to hear the petitioners'
federal constitutional challenge to their state criminal convictions. The relevant jtirisdictional statute required that the petitioners obtain a decision from the highest state court
from which a decision could issue before seeking certiorari. See 375 U.S. at 138 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1958)). Interpreting that statute as incorporating by reference certain elements of Florida law, the Court certified to the Florida Supreme Court questions about the
appellate jurisdiction of the Florida courts. Id. at 138-39. Although the state law question
did not directly bear on the federal constitutional issues in the case, the determination of
the state law question nevertheless might obviate the need to engage in the constitutional
analysis.
64
416 U.S. 386, 387-88, 391-92 (1974). Lehman Bros. was a shareholders' derivative
action, brought in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, based upon a
theory of misappropriation of information by a corporate insider. See id. at 388. While
New York state courts had approved of liability tinder a misappropriation theory, see Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969), the courts of Florida-whose laws governed the dispute under applicable choice-of-law rules, Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817,
821 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974)-had yet
to rule definitively on whether such a theory was viable, id. The federal district court and
court of appeals reached opposite results as to the right result under Florida law, with the
district court determining that Florida law did not support a misappropriation theory, see
Gildenhorn v. Lum's Inc., 335 F. Supp. 329, 333-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd sub nom.Schein
v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S.
386 (1974), and the court of appeals concluding that it did, Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d at
821-23. The Supreme Court granted certiorari solely to consider whether "the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit err[ed] in not certifying the question of Florida law to the
Florida Supreme Court pursuant to Florida's certification procedure." Lehman Bros. v.
Schein, 414 U.S. 1062, 1062 (1973).
65 416 U.S. at 391 (footnote omitted).
66
Id. at 390.
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elty of the question and the great unsettlement of [state] law," 67 and
remanded the case, requiring the court of appeals to consider the pos6
sibility of employing certification. 8
The Supreme Court has echoed its complimentary treatment of
certification in the decades since Schein.69 Indeed, the procedure has,
where it is available, supplanted Pullman abstention as the preferred
method of securing from a state court the proper interpretation of
state law. 70 In addition, twice since Schein, the Court has certified
questions of state law, but on both occasions the cases fit squarely into
7
the Pullman model. '
In summary, there is a class of cases, pure diversity cases in which
unsettled questions of state law are presented, no substantial state inId. at 391.
See id. at 391-92.
69
See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. 43, 77-80 (1997); Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1976).
70
See Arizonansfor Official English, 520 U.S. at 75 ("Certification today covers territory
once dominated by a deferral device called 'Pullman abstention' ....
); cf Vickers v. Trainor, 546 F.2d 739, 744-46 (7th Cir. 1976) (unavailability of certification makes it less likely
that a federal court will afford the state court system the chance to rule on questions of
state law). Certification's ascension is due largely to its ability to offer definitive answers to
state law questions while reducing the prime Pullman abstention drawback: delay in resolving cases. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
71
See Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23 (1999); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978).
In Elkins, nonimmigrant alien students challenged, as violative of federal constitutional and statutory law, a decision by the University of Maryland that the students could
not, as a matter of law, become residents of Maryland eligible for in state tuition rates. See
435 U.S. at 652-55. The Supreme Court observed that reversing the lower courts' rejection of this argument would ultimately require it to overrule one of its own prior constitutional interpretations. Id. at 660-61. It also noted, however, that resolution of a subsidiary
question might obviate the need to confront this earlier interpretation, see id. at 661, and
that "the resolution of this [subsidiary] question turn[ed] on federal statutory law and
Maryland common law as to each of which there are no controlling precedents ....
Id. at
662. Accordingly, after clarifying the governing federal statutory law, see id. at 663-68, the
Court certified questions of state law to the Maryland Court of Appeals, see id. at 668-69.
Fiore involved a petition for habeas relief. See 528 U.S. at 25. The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania convicted the petitioner and his codefendants of a crime under a Pennsylvania statute. See id. at 24. Each defendant appealed to a different intermediate appellate court. See id. The court considering the habeas petitioner's appeal affirmed the
conviction, and when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to review the case that
conviction became final. Id. at 26. However, the appellate court hearing the petitioner's
codefendant's appeal reversed the codefendant's conviction. Id. at 26-27. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed that decision, thus rendering an interpretation of the relevant Pennsylvania statute favorable to the petitioner. Id. at 27.
After two more denied review requests, the petitioner sought habeas relief in federal
court on the ground that, by failing to apply the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
his case, the state had violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. See id. at 28. The Court explained that "[t]he validity of [the petitioner's] federal
claim may depend upon whether the interpretation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
[the subsequent case] was always the statute's meaning, even at the time of [the petitioner's] trial." Id. Accordingly, the Court certified that question to the state high court.
See id. at 29.
67

68
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terests are implicated, and no issue of federal law lurks, 72 for which
certification may be justified but, if Meredith remains good law, Pullman abstention is not. 73 Neither the Supreme Court nor any other

federal court has addressed in any detail either the federal jurisdictional basis for certification or the propriety, in light of the constitutional and statutory grants of diversity jurisdiction, of certification in
pure diversity cases where no questions of federal law can be found.
C.

Overview of the Certification Procedure

Certification involves one court system enlisting the aid of a second court system to resolve a case, while affording the second court
system the opportunity to announce a rule of law. The jurisprudence
of certification reflects this judicial interdependence.
Assuming certification is an available option,7 4 one or more of
the parties to the federal case may request that the federal court in72
For ease, I refer generally to diversity cases in which there is no federal law issue
and in which no substantial state interest is implicated (and which meet none of the other
justifications for Pullman abstention elucidated in Pullman, Meredith, and their progeny)
simply as "pure diversity cases."
7"4
In addition to pure diversity cases, Meredith's rule presumably also applies in cases
that are in federal court pursuant to jurisdictional provisions which favor federal court
jurisdiction based upon the identity of one or more of the parties as opposed to the legal
basis for any cause of action raised. An example would be a case brought pursuant to the
jurisdictional provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330(a), 1441 (d) (2000), where all the causes of action sound in state law. SeeJonathan
Remy Nash, PendentPartyJurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 16 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 71, 117 (1998) ("The prime jurisdictional goal of the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act] is to guarantee foreign states facing claims in U.S. courts access to a federal forum in
order to ensure uniform judicial treatment.") (footnote omitted)); see also 12 U.S.C.
§ 1819(b) (2) (B) (2000) (authorizing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to remove state court actions to which it is a party); id. § 1441a() (3) (A) (authorizing the Resolution Trust Corporation to remove state court actions involving a financial institution for
which the Corporation has been appointed receiver or conservator); 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)
(2000) (permitting removal of civil actions and criminal prosecution commenced in state
court against officers of the United States acting under color of their authority); id.
§ 1442a (provision analogous to § 1442(a), applicable to members of the United States
armed forces); id. § 1444 (allowing the United States to remove foreclosure actions
brought against it in state court).
It is also possible that certification may be justified, while Pullman abstention is not,
where resolution of a state law issue might obviate the need for the federal court to resolve
a federal law issue not of constitutional magnitude. However, it is not clear that Pullman
abstention is precluded in such a circumstance. See supra note 33. Moreover, the rationale
of Meredith-that federal courts should exercise their diversity jurisdiction in order to vindicate the decision of Congress to vest the courts with that jurisdiction, see supra text accompanying note 30-is far less applicable in federal question cases where state law issues
are intertwined with federal law issues.
74
As a threshold matter, certification of a question of state law will be an available
option to a federal court only if the state whose law is at issue offers a certification procedure for the federal court to exercise. A federal court will not ask a state high court to
respond to any questions of state law if there is no procedure tinder state law that authorizes certification. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 493 n.21
(1983). A more difficult question is whether federal courts might have the power to certify
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questions in the absence of a state certification procedure. SeeWeaver v. Marine Bank, 683
F.2d 744, 747 n.3 (3d Cir. 1982), holding that,
[w]hen the authority for a federal court to certify a question to the state
court, absent a state statute allowing the procedure has been questioned, it
has not been from the perspective of the federal court's power to do so.
Rather, the issue has been whether the state courts can constitutionally be
compelled to answer a certified question if they lack constitutional or legislative authority to do so.
For example, Wright, Miller, and Cooper describe it as "clear that a federal court cannot
compel a state court to answer questions in the absence of a state procedure." 17A WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 8, § 4248, at 163 (footnote omitted). Other commentators assert that
Congress has the authority to imbue the federal courts with this power. See Hogue, supra
note 18, at 541 (suggesting that Congress could and should use its power under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. V, § 1 to "prescribe the . . . [e]ffect of state
judgments ... [by] enact[ing] a federal statute imposing on state supreme courts an obligation to decide unclear issues of state law certified by federal courts, trial and appellate,
for resolution" (alterations added) (footnote omitted)); Selya, supra note 20, at 683-84
(noting that that Congress can require state courts to entertain federal causes of action
under Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), and that "Congress... might possibly be able to
compel state courts to accept and answer questions anent state law posed by federal
courts");J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE
L. REV. 317, 325 (1967) (finding no constitutional infirmity with the idea that "Congress
may have authority to require state courts to accept and decide certified questions"). But
see FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 43, at 39-41, 169 (4th ed. Supp. 2002) (suggesting that the
Supreme Court's opinion in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), may draw into question
Testa's vitality, and that this may "bear on the question of Congress'[s] power to require
state courts to answer certified questions"). One student commentator speculated, before
the advent of certification, that federal courts of equity might have inherent nonstatutory
power to certify cases, see Note, Consequences ofAbstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1358, 1368 (1960), in which case "it is arguable that the state courts, even in the absence of
state enabling legislation, would be constitutionally obliged to give an answer [to a certified question]," id. at 1369 (footnote omitted). See generally Peter Jeremy Smith, The AnticommandeeringPrincipleand Congress'sPower to Direct State JudicialAction: Congress's Power to
Compel State Courts to Answer Certified Questions of State Law, 31 CONN. L. REv. 649 (1999)
(exploring whether Congress has the ability to allow federal courts to order state courts to
answer certified questions of state law).
In fact, most states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, offer federal
courts the option to certify questions of state law to the state high court. Lists of the various state enactments on certification are found in 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4248,
at 167 n.30 and 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4248, at 28 n.30 (Supp. 2002). See also
Hogue, supra note 18, at 536 & nn.18-20 (surveying state statutes and rules authorizing
certification in effect in 1995). The procedures of many states are based on the Uniform
Certification of Questions of Law Act, the current version of which is found at 12 U.L.A.
67, 67-98 (1996). See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4248, at 167; Corr & Robbins,
supra note 20, at 418; Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A
Proposalfor Reform, 18J. LEGIS. 127, 128-29 (1992).
Many states also allow lower federal courts and courts of other states to submit certified questions to their highest courts. See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4248, at
167-68 & nn.31-33 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 2002). Not every state that has a certification
procedure allows every federal court to certify questions to its state high court, however.
Judge Frank Easterbrook (sitting by designation as a district court judge) complained of
just such a shortcoming in Illinois's certification procedure in In re MahurkarDoubleLumen
Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litigation, 750 F. Supp. 330, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1990):
I doubt very much that Illinois would interpret the fiduciary shield doctrine
to protect those who may be liable under [a federal patent statute] from
any suit, anywhere in the world. Of course I cannot be sure of this. Because
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of patent cases, the question could
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voke certification, 75 or the federal court may choose that option sua
sponte.76 Either way, the federal court has final discretion over
whether or not to employ certification. 77 It is the federal court, not
not be submitted to the state courts except by certification. And Rule 20 of
the Rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois provides that only the Supreme
Court of the United States or the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit may certify questions of state law to that court-neither this
court nor the Federal Circuit, to which an appeal lies from my decision, has
been invited to certify questions of law.
75
See, e.g.,
7TH CIR. R. 52 (permitting the court to certify questions of state law to a
state high court on motion of a party); In re Badger Lines, Inc., 140 F.3d 691, 698-99 (7th
Cir. 1998) (certifying a question of state law on motion of a party); 17A WRICHr Cr AL.,
supra note 8, § 4248, at 176 ("There is nothing to bar a party from suggesting the desirability of certification ....");see also James A. Parker et al., Certification and Removal: Practices
and Procedures, 31 N.M. L. REV. 161, 170 (2001), noting that:
Only thirty percent of the requests by counsel to certify a question to a state
court have been honored by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals; seventy
percent of the time they turn down the request to certify. These are figures
from 1990 through 1994, the best that we could get, and that's the highest
rate of refusals by a circuit court in the United States. Some refuse only
about fifteen percent of the time. (footnote omitted).
However, federal courts have the discretion to consider the posture of the party seeking
certification in determining whether to grant the request. See sources cited infra note 77.
76 See, e.g.,
7TH CIR. R. 52 (permitting the court to certify questions of state law to a
state high court sua sponte); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 662 (1978) (certifying a question of state law sua sponte); 17A WRIGHT CT AL., supra note 8, § 4248, at 176 ("Ordinarily a
court will order certification on its own motion." (footnote omitted)).
77 See, e.g., Barnes v. AtI. & Pac. Life his. Co. of Am., 514 F.2d 704, 705 n.4 (5th Cir.
1975).
A federal court will consider numerous factors in deciding whether to exercise its
discretion to certify questions of state law to a state high court. See Florida ex rel. Shevin v.
Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 274-75 (5th Cir. 1976); 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8,
§ 4248, at 172-75. But see Clark, supra note 16, at 1549 ("[C]ertification patterns vary
widely among federal courts and are largely ad hoc."). Perhaps the most important factor
is the degree to which state law on the issue in question is unclear and difficult to predict:
A federal court is not likely to certify a question of state law, the answer to which is clear or
easy to anticipate. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471 (1987). A federal court
also might refuse to certify a question of state law that it feels is either unlikely to recur, see,
e.g., Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc. v. Mason (In re Makula), 172 F.3d 493, 496-97 (7th Cir.
1999); see also Messenger ex rel. Messenger v. Gruner +Jahr Printing & Publishing, 175 F.3d
262, 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1999) (court decided to certify a state law question in part because
of the question's importance), or does not raise significant issues of public policy, see, e.g.,
Doninick's Finer Foods, Inc., 172 F.3d at 496-97; Diginet, Inc. v. W. Union ATS, Inc., 958 F.2d
1388, 1395 (7th Cir. 1992). But cf Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism:State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1420-21 (1999) (suggesting that cases which
raise parallel state and federal constitutional issues may be "less suitable for certification
than cases in which the federal issue turns on the construction of a disputed provision of
state law" on the grounds that state courts may require a more developed factual record to
respond to state constitutional questions than is likely to be assembled in such cases, and
that the presence of a federal constitutional issue in such cases means that a potentially
dispositive federal issue that can render the resolution of the state constitutional issue irrelevant always exists, making it less likely for the state courts to accept certification in the first
instance).
Further, the posture of the parties might affect a federal court's willingness to certify
questions of state law. See 17A WRIGir ET AL., supra note 8, § 4248, at 176 ("[T]he court
should be slow to honor a request for certification from a party who chose to invoke fed-
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the parties, that invokes the procedure by promulgating and sending
to the state high court a certificate that sets forth the questions of state
law for which answers are sought.78 The certifying court normally includes a statement of the necessary background facts to provide con79
text for the certified questions.
A state high court has discretion to accept or reject the certifying
court's questions.t 1 Assuming it chooses to accept the certification,
eraljurisdiction."). Some courts have indicated that they will be less receptive to a certification request from a plaintiff who opted to bring a diversity case in federal court, see, e.g.,
Fischer v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 857 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1988), or from a defendant who, after receiving an adverse ruling from a state trial judge, removed the case to
federal court, see, e.g., Nat'l Bank of Wash. v. Pearson, 863 F.2d 322, 327 (4th Cir. 1988).
But see infra note 168 (referring to a survey indicating that the sizeable majority ofjudges
do not object to a party who has removed a case to federal court seeking to have questions
of state law certified to the state high court). Finally, courts are reluctant to grant a request
for certification from an appellant who received an adverse ruling below and seeks certification for the first time on appeal. See, e.g.,
In re McLinn, 744 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir.
1984).
In determining whether to invoke certification procedure, federal courts also will balance the benefits of certification in the particular case against the delay inherent in using
the procedure. See, e.g.,
Erie Ins. Group v. Sear Corp., 102 F.3d 889, 892 (7th Cir. 1996);
Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285, 294 n.9 (2d Cir. 1986); see generally infra note
108 and accompanying text (discussing the delay inherent in certification). In particular,
while certification in theory can be invoked at any stage of a case, a court likely will consider a tardy request for certification less favorably than a request made early in a proceeding. See, e.g.,
Nieves v. Univ. of P.R., 7 F.3d 270, 278 & n.15 (lst Cir. 1993) (rejecting
request for certification first raised on appeal); Fischer, 857 F.2d at 8 (same); Perkins v.
Clark Equip. Co., 823 F.2d 207, 209-10 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that requests for certification made only after adverse judgments "should be discouraged"); see also 17A WRIC.HT ET
AL., supra note 8, § 4248, at 25 (Supp. 2002) (noting that "the failure of a party to suggest
certification until a late stage in the proceeding considerably weakens this insistence on
certification").
78 The certifying court promulgates the certificate, which is directed to the judges of
the state high court. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bryan (In re Wilson), 162 F.3d 378, 378 (5th Cir.
1998) (certificate addressed to the "TO THE HONORABLE CHIEFJUSTICE AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA").
79
See, e.g., Wilson, 162 F.3d at 378-79. Indeed, state certification statutes or rules
generally require a statement of facts. See, e.g., FLA. R. App. P. 9.150(b) ("The certificate
shall contain ... a statement of the facts showing the nature of the cause and the circumstances out of which the questions of law arise ....").Further, a state court may decline to
decide the certified questions in the absence of a statement of facts. See infra note 82 and
accompanying text.
80 See, e.g.,
Cuesnongle v. Ramos, 835 F.2d 1486, 1493 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[W]e acknowledge that the power of the Commonwealth court to answer questions certified to it by a
federal court is discretionary, not mandatory." (citation omitted)); Schlieter v. Carlos, 775
P.2d 709, 710 (N.M. 1989) ("[W]e may undertake at our discretion to answer [certified]
questions when the answers are 'determinative' of the cause before the federal court.");
Tunick v. Safir, 731 N.E.2d 597, 598-99 (N.Y. 2000) (declining to answer questions certified by the Second Circuit); see also Corr & Robbins, supra note 20, at 456 n.174 (citing
source which states that the decision to answer a certified question is usually at the discretion of the state court); Parker et al., supra note 75, at 170 ("Between 1990 and 1994 there
were 284 requests [to answer certified questions] from district courts and all the circuit
courts in the United States, to state courts, and of these requests, there were only seven
refusals to accept the certification."); Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the
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the state high court proceeds in accordance with any governing statutes or rules. 8' State courts considering certified questions do not engage in fact finding. Certification applies only to questions of law;
thus, state courts have treated the collection by the certifying federal
court of all necessary ancillary factual findings as a prerequisite to
proper certification.

82

Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. REV. 305, 323-24 (1994) (discussing the reasons a state court
might decline to answer a certified question). Some state provisions on certification make
this discretion explicit. See, e.g., N.Y. COMe. CODES R. & REGzs. tit. 22, § 500.17(d) (2001).
But see supra note 74 (discussing the possibility that Congress might have the power to
mandate state courts to accept certified questions).
If the state court determines that its responses to fewer than all of the questions certified resolves the controversy before the certifying court, thereby obviating the need to
address the remaining questions, the state court may so inform the certifying court and
decline to proceed further. See, e.g., County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 629
A.2d 1084, 1086 n.4 (Conn. 1993). Along similar lines, the state court has discretion to
rephrase the questions if it feels that doing so would be appropriate. See, e.g., County of
Westchester v. Comm'r of Transp., 9 F.3d 242, 247 (2d Cir. 1993); Victor v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 908 P.2d 1043, 1044 n.2 (Alaska 1996); see 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8,
§ 4248, at 178, observing:
[I] t is now the common practice of many courts, when certifying, to emphasize that the particular phrasing used in the certified question is not to
restrict the state court and that the state court is free to reformulate the
questions as it sees fit. State courts have availed themselves of this freedom
whether or not it is expressly stated in the certificate. (footnotes omitted).
See supra note 73. State statutes or court rules governing certification generally
81
assert only minimal procedural instructions. Rules governing payment of tees, the filing of
briefs, and oral arguments are, in most states, provided by state statutes or court rules of
general applicability. See Corr & Robbins, supra note 20, at 418; JackJ. Rose, Note, Erie
R.R. and State Power to Control State Law: Switching Tracks to New Certification of Questions of
Law Procedures, 18 HOFSIsRA L. REV. 421, 428 (1989). See also Brian Mattis, Certification of
Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 717, 728 (1969) ("All of the present certification procedures require that briefs be
filed along with the question that is certified. It is usually necessary and desirable for the
record on appeal to be transmitted to the court that is to answer the question."). But see,
e.g., FiA. R. Ape. P. 9.150 (providing for specific procedures for certification proceedings);
N.Y. COMP. CoorFs R. & RFGS. tit. 22, § 500.17(d), (e) (2001) (same).
82
See Nieves v. Univ. of P.R., 7 F.3d 270, 277 n.] 1 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The Puerto Rico
Stpreme Court would reject any certification of this factually undeveloped issue." (citation
omitted)); Catlin v. Ambach, 820 F.2d 588, 591 n.2 (2d Cir. 1987) ("We deem abstention
preferable to use of the ... certification procedure because the resolution of the state law
issue might require factfinding in the state courts."); Santasucci v. Gallen, 607 F.2d 527,
529 ( 1st Cir. 1979) (noting that the district court's decision not to certify questions of state
law was "reasonable" where there were "a number of disputed factual issues") (footnote
omitted); Sangamo Weston, Inc. v. Nat'l Sur. Corp., 414 S.E.2d 127, 130 (S.C. 1992) (holding that the court was unable to accept the certified question because the factual record
was not developed sufficiently and the court would not "issue advisory opinions and cannot
alter precedent based on questions presented in the abstract"); Hanchey v. Steighner (In re
Certified Question from the U.S. Dist. Court, Dist. of Wyo.), 549 P.2d 1310, 1311 (Wyo.
1976) (rejecting a certification request as "premature" in light of the absence of factfinding); 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4248, at 174 ("Certification is not appropriate if
there are a number of disputed factual issues making it difficult or impossible to agree on
what the legal questions are.") (footnote omitted).
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The state high court's involvement ends when it returns answers
to the question or questions certified to the certifying court.8 3 Federal
courts were initially uncertain as to whether a state court's response to
a certified question bound the certifying court with respect to the
question certified. In 1963, the Fifth Circuit allowed for the possibility
that answers given by state high courts in response to certified questions could be either "merely advisory and entitled, like dicta, to be
given persuasive but not binding effect as a precedent, or ... credited
under Erie-Tompkins doctrine and the rule of stare decisis as though
it were the ratio decidendi of a decision made in adversary litigation
before the court. ' 84 Although statements to the contrary have not disappeared entirely, 5 modern federal courts generally agree that they
are bound to follow state court responses to certified questions.8 6 The
83
See Corr & Robbins, supra note 20, at 419 ("When a certified question is answered
and returned to the certifying court, . . . the state high court's influence over the case is
effectively ended.").
84 Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505, 509 (5th Cir. 1963) (footnotes omitted),
rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 179 (1964); see In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 830-32 (Me.
1966) (discussing concern that federal court would not feel bound by state high court's
answers to certified questions); United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855,
858-59 (Tex. 1965) (same); cf Stanton S. Kaplan, Note, Certification of Questionsfrom Federal
Appellate Courts to the Florida Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 413, 432 (1962) (arguing that a state high court answering certified questions "does not acquire jurisdiction ultimately to decide a controversy before the federal
courts, but renders only an advisory opinion to the federal judiciary" (emphasis in
original)).
In elucidating the possibility that a state high court's answer to a certified question
might be dicta, the Fifth Circuit, in Clay, cited several Florida Supreme Court cases discussing when language of that court constituted dicta. See 319 F.2d at 509 & n.3. It thus appears that the Fifth Circuit considered that question to be governed by state law rather
than federal law. The Fifth Circuit explained that it did not have to decide how determinative the certified answer of the Florida Supreme Court standing alone would be, because a
lower Florida court had already followed the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court and
the federal court felt obligated to follow the lower court's opinion under Erie and its progeny. See id. at 508-09.
85
See United States v. Rural Elec. Convenience Coop. Co., 922 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir.
1991) (describing, in dicta, the Supreme Court's decision to certify a state law question to a
state supreme court as "direct[ing] that the relevant state law question be certified to the
state courts for an advisory opinion"); Thomas E. Baker, A Catalogue ofJudicialFederalism in
the United States, 46 S.C. L. REv. 835, 865 (1995) (noting that, as an alternative to abstention, "a litigant can wait for a state advisory opinion through the mechanics of certification
of the state law issue..."); cf Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc., 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("As [A]rticle III courts, the district courts must always be free to decline to
follow [Bankruptcy Appellate Panel] decisions and to formulate their own rules within
their jurisdiction.").
86 See, e.g., Purifoy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 567 F.2d 268, 269 (4th Cir.
1977) (describing the Maryland state court's response to a certified question of Maryland
law as "definitive"); Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Sec'y of Army of U.S., 489 F.2d 777, 779 (5th
Cir. 1973) (noting that Florida Supreme Court's response to a certified question of Florida
law is the "last word" on the law of that state); see 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4248,
at 179; see also Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Idaho
1983) (asserting that the Idaho Supreme Court expects its answers to certified questions to
be determinative of the law of Idaho).
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federal courts predominately base this view on the belief that Erie and
its progeny require them to follow the answers rendered by state high
courts in response to certified questions.8 7 However, a few opinions

reach the same result via an alternative reasoning: these courts hold
that state high court opinions are to be followed under the "law of the
case" doctrine. 88
D.

Costs and Benefits of Certification
Certification is generally viewed as furthering the interests ofjudi-

cial federalism. Moreover, many commentators laud the procedure
for imposing fewer costs on litigants than alternative systems with simiInstructive in this regard is the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Grover ex rel. Grover v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994). There, the federal district court had, at plaintiffs'
request, certified a question of state law to the Ohio Supreme Court. The state supreme
court, by a vote of four to three, answered the question in the defendant's favor, whereupon the federal district court granted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss their complaint without prejudice. Id. at 717-19. Apparently, the district court contemplated allowing the
plaintiffs to bring their action anew in the future, should the dissenting view on the Ohio
Supreme Court attain a majority over time, because the district court favored the plaintiffs'
case. See id. at 719.
The Sixth Circuit chided the district court for having "ignored the binding effect, of
the Ohio Supreme Court's majority opinion .. " Id. It explained: "A federal court that
certifies a question of state law should not be free to treat the answer as merely advisory
unless the state court specifically contemplates that result." Id. Accordingly, the federal
court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for entry of judgment, with
prejudice, in the defendant's favor. See id.
87
See, e.g., Tarr v. Manchester Ins. Corp., 544 F.2d 14, 14 (1st Cir. 1976) (noting that a
federal court "cannot 'correct' a state court's interpretation of its own law"); Allen v. Estate
of Carman, 486 F.2d 491, 492 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing Erie as the reason that the state supreme court's decision is definitive); Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Lee County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 467 F.2d 447, 450 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1972) (same); Martinez v. Rodriquez, 410 F.2d 729,
730 (5th Cir. 1969) (same).
88
See, e.g., Sifers v. Gen. Marine Catering Co., 892 F.2d 386, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1990)
(noting that a state court's answer to a certified question "generally is the 'law of the case'
in any further federal court proceeding involving those parties," and as a result, "it is binding as well upon those parties in this appeal who were not parties to the certified case"
(footnote omitted)); seealso Grover, 33 F.3d at 719 (citing Sifers favorably for the proposition that "parties are bound by an answer to a certified question because it is the law of the
case"). The "law of the case" doctrine instructs courts to adhere to previous decisions
rendered within that case absent extreme circumstances such as an intervening change in
the controlling law, the discovery of new evidence, or where the previous decisions reflect
clear error or manifest injustice. 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4478, at 637, 670-72
(2d ed. 2002). Thus, as the first quoted excerpt from the Sifers case reflects, the "law of the
case" doctrine does not mandate that a court follow previous decisions within that case
without exception, but only "generally." 892 F.2d at 391. It is unclear whether, as a consequence, courts that follow state high court answers to certified questions based on the "law
of the case" doctrine have a wider (or narrower) berth to choose whether or not to do so
than do courts that follow such answers under an Erie theory.
It seems that the Fifth Circuit added teeth to this "law of the case" approach in Blair v.
Sealift, Inc., 91 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 1996). There, the court of appeals held that the application of the "law of the case" doctrine to a prior ruling that "effectively implement[s] a state
supreme court's response to a question certified earlier [in] the case [directs that] deference to the ruling is particularly appropriate." Id. at 761.
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lar goals, such as abstention. While this may be true, certification
costs, both temporal and monetary, are not insignificant. Indeed, a
minority of commentators suggests that the procedure's costs outweigh its benefits. This section surveys the benefits and the costs generally associated with certification, but takes no position on whether,
on balance, certification is a beneficial procedure.
One benefit of certification is that it furthers the interests associated with judicial federalism.8 9 First, the procedure offers benefits to
states in general, and to state judicial systems in particular. The prerogative of a state government to establish and define its own state law
is enhanced by such a procedure, and it gives the state judiciary the
opportunity to rule on important issues of state law in cases in which it
might not otherwise have had the chance. 90 Second, certification offers a federalism benefit to federal courts. Insofar as it allows a state
court to determine pertinent issues of state law, certification spares a
federal court the difficult chore of determining state law. 9' Moreover,
89 See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (noting that certification
"does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperativejudicial federalism" (footnote omitted)); Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Lee County Bd. of Pub.
Instruction, 467 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1972) (stating that certification "minimiz[es] or
eliminat[es] entirely the confusion, uncertainty and juridical friction inherent in a system
of Federalism that frequently forces Federal Judges to assume-often with extreme reluctance-a decisional rule that properly belongs to their brethren on the State bench"); AM.
LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISI)ICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

293 (1969) noting that
[t]he argument for certification, accepted by the Institute, is that it makes it
possible for the federal court to obtain a quick and authoritative answer to
difficult state law questions that the case may present while preserving the
parties' right to a federal determination of fact questions and issues of federal law in the case.
Clark, supra note 16, at 1550 ("Certification is perhaps uniquely suited to further the principles of judicial federalism underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Eiie."); Jessica
Smith, Avoiding Prognostication and Promoting Federalism: The Need for an Inter-Jurisdictional
Certification Procedure in North Carolina, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2123, 2132-36 (1999); Beth A.
Hardy, Note, CertificationBefore FacialInvalidation:A Return to Federalism, 12 W. NEw ENG. L.
REV. 217, 221-22 (1990).
9)
See, e.g., Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W.2d 793, 798 n.9 (Tex.
1992).
91
SeeUnited States v. Buras, 475 F.2d 1370, 1375 (5th Cir. 1972) (Brown, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Our wide experience with certification to the
Florida Supreme Court has ... proved its utility in sparing this Court-and more importantly, the litigants-the risk of a wrong decision .... " (footnote omitted)); McCarthy v.
Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 158-59 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi,J., dissenting) (describing the Second Circuit's difficulties in predicting state law); Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj
Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 302-03 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker,J., dissenting) (describing the Third Circuit's difficulties in predicting state law); United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v.
Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 486-87 (5th Cir. 1964) (Brown, J., concurring) (lamenting occasions on which the Fifth Circuit had endeavored, but failed, to predict accurately state
law); see also Clark, supra note 16, at 1553-54.
For additional discussion of the difficulties faced by federal courts in their efforts to
determine state-law, see Sloviter, supra note 2, at 1675-76 and Clark, supra note 16, at
1495-1544.
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certification offers three important benefits that abstention does not.
First, it guarantees that the state's highest court-the only court capable of rendering a "definitive" statement of state law under Erie and its
progeny 9 2-will decide the state law question where the state court
accepts the certified question. 93 Second, certification avoids procedural complications that might hinder the state court system's resolution
of the state law question were abstention employed. 9 4 Third, certification offers a federalism benefit to litigants in the form of "fairness."
Specifically, it provides federal court litigants the benefit of a resolution of their case based upon definitive state law, as determined by the
95
state high court.
Although it does provide federalism benefits, certification does
not uniformly advance the interests ofjudicial federalism. First, to the
extent that one believes that diversity jurisdiction intentionally allows
certain cases to be heard in a federal forum in order to avoid the
possibility or appearance of bias that likely would be found in a state
forum, 96 certification hinders federalism because it may undermine

that design by rechanneling cases to the state courts. As the Court
explained in Meredith, the federal courts should not lightly shirk their
responsibility to fulfill their "duty .... if their jurisdiction is properly

invoked, to decide questions of state law whenever necessary to the
'97
rendition of a judgment.

Second, Geri Yonover argues that federal courts' attempts to predict state law has a salutary impact on the subsequent development of
state law. 98 Third, James Rehnquist broadly criticizes the abstention
doctrine on the ground that the Constitution remains neutral as to
See supra note 17 and accompanying text. But cf. Larry M. Roth, Certified Questions
from the Federal Courts: Review and Re-proposal, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 11 (1979) (suggesting
that certified questions be heard not by the state supreme court, but rather by a "special
court," the members of which would be appointed by the state's chief judicial officer).
93 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997) (comparing
Pullman abstention to certification, and finding that certification "increas[es] the assurance of gaining an authoritative response").
94 An entire state court proceeding well might involve multiple hearings and appeals.
Moreover, a state court hearing an independent case is free presumably to engage in
factfinding, see infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text, and to add or dismiss parties, see
text accompanying infra note 264. In contrast, a state high court answering certified questions does not enjoy these prerogatives, see in ra notes 160, 264, and accompanying text.
95 See Selya, supra note 20, at 690.
96 Such a view accords generally with Richard Fallon's ideology of federal courts law.
Cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1159
(1988) (noting that the Nationalist model understands the Constitution to "contemplate[ ]
a special role for the federal judiciary, different in kind from that assigned to state courts,
in ensuring the supremacy of national authority"); id. at 1223 (suggesting that the Federalist and Nationalist models explain different decisions under the Pulnan regime, so one
cannot say definitively that either model, standing alone, explains the doctrine).
97 Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
98 See Yonover, supra note 80, at 334-42.
92
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whether a federal or state forum is preferable in any particular case. 9
As such, he argues that there is no federal interest in abstaining from
hearing a pending case' 0 11unless a case that raises identical issues was
already filed in state court.10 1 Fourth, Judge Bruce Selya argues that
certification's "fairness" benefit is generally overvalued and somewhat
ephemeral.1 12 He notes that a litigant who loses a case by virtue of a
federal court's ruling on state law, which ultimately is revealed to be
flawed in a subsequent decision of the relevant state high court, "is no
more greatly disadvantaged than a litigant who loses in a lower state
court and is thereafter denied discretionary review, only to have the
state's high court decide the issue favorably in some other case at a
later date."1 03 Judge Selya further notes that, "[m]ore generally, litigants do not have an entitlement to something identifiable in the ab10 4
stract as a 'right' answer."'
Notwithstanding the above listed criticisms, the majority of commentators agree that certification furthers several highly valued federalism interests, and poll results show that this is also the view of a
majority of federal and state judges. 1°5 By contrast, the value of certification from the perspective of judicial economy and cost to litigants,
both temporal and monetary, is subject to greater disagreement. As a
threshold matter, it seems indisputable that, given a choice between
abstention and certification, the latter procedure imposes less cost
than does the former. First, because certification entails resort to only
one court in the state judicial system (the highest court of the state),
in most cases it will not result in as much delay as abstention. Second,
along similar lines, it will not impose as much monetary cost.' 0 6 Thus,
99 SeeJames C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1053-57 (1994).
100
See id. at 1072-73, 1077-78, 1081-82 (critiquing various forms of abstention because they do not require that a state case be pending before abstention is used).
101
See id. at 1063-69, 1110-14.
102
Selya, supra note 20, at 690.
103
Id. Query also whether a litigant who wins a case based on a federal court's interpretation of state law, which a subsequent state high court case reveals to be erroneous,
would likely claim either that the federal court interpretation was in fact "wrong" or that
the federal court's decision did not provide a "benefit" to him or her.
104
Id.
105
SeeJONA GOLDSCHMIDT, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW: FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE 66 (1995) (noting that in a survey conducted under the auspices of the American
Judicature Society and the State Justice Institute, "[a]lmost all of the circuitjudges (93%),
districtjudges (86%), and state justices (87%) agreethat certification improves federal-state
comity"); Corr & Robbins, supra note 20, at 457 ("[F]ederal and state judges responding to
[a] survey [on certification] concluded that the federal courts' use of certification improves federal-state comity.").
106
See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997) (comparing
Pullman abstention to certification, and stating that certification "reduc[es] the delay,
[and] cut[s] the cost"). But see William C. Bednar, Jr., Comment, Abstention Under Delaney:
A CurrentAppraisal,49 TEX. L. REV. 247, 264 (1971) (asserting that the advantages of certification "only mute the criticism of abstention-they do not silence them," and that certifi-
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the Supreme Court has explained that, as compared to Pullman ab'' 7
stention, certification saves "time, energy, and resources. 11
Despite general recognition that the delay inherent in certification is less than the delay inherent in Pullman abstention, some commentators assert that delay under certification is generally
underestimated or undervalued by courts and in fact argues for more
judicious use of the procedure.1 08 Generally, however, this is the minority view. 1o, Overall, the legal community views certification favorably; in particular the reaction of members of the federal and state
1
judiciaries is overwhelmingly positive. 0
This Article takes no view as to whether, on balance, the benefits
of certification outweigh the costs. However, it should be noted that
the federalism benefits which certification offers mirror the reasons
for eliminating or at least restricting the federal diversity jurisdiction.
If one accepts the advisability of retaining the federal diversity jurisdiccation actually introduces a "new difficulty," in that "[t]he abstract form of the certified
question itself may well distort the state court's answer" (footnotes omitted)).
107
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
108
See, e.g., Mattis, supra note 81, at 725-27; Selya, supra note 20, at 681 & nn.16-19,
688; Yonover, supra note 80, at 324-25 & n. 115, 332-33. The delay may be particularly
nettlesome where the state court ultimately refuses to answer the certified question.
109
See, e.g., GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 105, at 67 ("Most circuit judges (83%) and
strong majorities of districtjudges (67%) and state justices (76%) disagreewith the proposition that the delay and expense of certification make it an impractical procedure for litigants."); Clark, supra note 16, at 1558-61; Richard B. Lillich & Raymond T. Mundy, Federal
Court Certification of Doubtful State Law Questions, 18 UCLA L. REV. 888, 908-09 (1971).
110
See generally GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 105, at 41-74 (reporting the results of a survey studying judges' views on certification); CARROLL SERON, CERTIFNG QUESTIONS OF
STArE LAw: EXPERIENCE OF FEDERALJUDGES 10 (1983) (same); Corr & Robbins, supra note
20, at 457 (same). Indeed, the esteem in which members of the judiciary hold certification
is reflected by academic works written by federal judges, which endorse, or speak favorably
of, certification. See also William G. Bassler & Michael Potenza, Certification Granted: The
Practical andJurisprudentialReasons Wy New Jersey Should Adopt a CertificationProcedure, 29
SETON HALL L. REV. 491 (1998) (coauthored by a U.S. District Court judge); John R.
Brown, ifth Circuit Certification-Federalism in Action, 7 CUMB. L. REV. 455 (1977)
(coauthored by Fifth Circtit Court of Appeals chief judge); John D. Btitzner, Jr. & Mary
Nash Kelly, Certification:Assuring the Primacy of State Law in the Fourth Circuit, 42 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 449 (1985) (coauthored by a Fourth Circuit judge); Karen LeCraft Henderson,
Certification:(Over)due Deference?, 63 CEO. WASh. L. REV. 637 (1995) (authored by a District
of Columbia Circuit Cotrt judge);Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, InteractiveJudicial
Federalism:Certified Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373 (2000) (coauthored by a
New York Court of Appeals judge);Jon 0. Newman, RestructuringFederalJurisdiction:Proposals to Preserve the Federaljudicial System, 56 U. CHU. L. REV. 761, 774-75 (1989) (Second
Circuit judge advocating the expansion of certification "by permitting the entire appeal of
a diversity case to be routed into the state appellate court system, where it would normally
be adjudicated, as it should be, by an intermediate state appellate court, with only optional
review by the state's highest court").
At the same time, the view of the federal judiciary is not monolithic. See Selya, supra
note 20 (critiquing certification, and authored by a First Circuit Court of Appeals judge);
Sloviter, supra note 2, at 1684-85 ("1 am skeptical that certification presents a viable solution to either the problem of federal encroachment on state sovereignty or the more limited problem of error in prophecy.").
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tion,l I then the federalism benefit it provides must outweigh the ben-

efits of restricting. The balance of this Article assumes that federal
diversity jurisdiction is desirable and therefore that its benefits outweigh any countervailing federalism benefit that certification might
offer. This Article also accepts the view of the majority of commentators and jurists that certification's benefits outweigh its costs. Regardless of its costs and benefits, the focus here is on determining whether
certification is defensible against constitutional and statutory
challenge.
II
THE UNITARY AND BINARY CONCEPTIONS

The vulnerability of certification to challenge on constitutional
and statutory grounds turns on whether one conceives of it as a binary
or unitary procedure. This Part defines and elucidates these competing conceptions.
The binary and unitary conceptions describe certification and
other procedural devices and settings. Part II.A provides a basic definition of the binary conception, and refines the definition through
identification of jurisdictional and procedural situations and doctrines that fall clearly within that conception. Part II.B performs a
similar task for the unitary conception. Part II.C describes how certification, as currently understood, is amenable to both conceptions. Finally, Part II.D discusses the limited reconcilability of the binary and
unitary conceptions. Although-as Parts II.A and II.B indicate-the
conceptions apply to different procedural settings and devices without
giving rise to any conflict or tension, the conceptions logically cannot
apply to the same procedural setting or device.
A.

Contours of the Binary Conception

The binary conception describes situations in which there are two
distinct "cases" under consideration. The most obvious example of
this is the common situation in which there are two cases, each pending before a different court and each with distinct parties. Each court
has jurisdiction over the case before it, and the two courts' jurisdictions are unrelated.
However, the binary conception is not concerned with the fact
that the two cases are on two different courts' dockets: It would not
affect the applicability of the binary conception if the two cases were
pending before the same court or even before the same judge. Nor is
the binary conception concerned with the identity of parties: It reIII The question of whether federal diversity jurisdiction should be retained is the
subject of much debate. See infra note 223.
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mains applicable even if the parties to the two cases are identical if,
for example, the issues in the two cases are unrelated. The jurisdictional settings of certain procedural doctrines are well described by
the binary conception. When a court in one case looks to the decision
of a court in another case for guidance, there are two distinct cases.
The binary conception thus aptly describes the jurisdictional settings
attendant to the doctrines of legal precedent and stare decisis. It similarly applies to cases in which federal courts follow decisions of state
courts under the Erie doctrine.' 12
Just as the binary conception applies when one court looks to
another court's decision for legal guidance, so too does it apply when
one court looks to another court for disposition of issues previously
litigated and decided under the doctrine of issue preclusion."I, It also
114
applies to describe applications of the claim preclusion doctrine.
Similarly, the binary conception describes collateral challenges to the
decision of one court in a second court. Thus, the binary conception
describes the two paths open to criminal defendants to challenge
their convictions-trial and direct appeal on the one hand, and
habeas review on the other-regardless of any clear relationship between the two cases.' 15 The binary conception also describes actions
to enforce a judgment obtained in a prior case.' 16
Applications of abstention doctrines also fall within the rubric of
the binary conception. When one court abstains in favor of another
court proceeding (either one that is pending or one that the federal
court contemplates will be filed in state court), there are two distinct
112
In other words, the conception applies whether a court looks for precedential guidance from inside or outside that court's own system.
113 See generally 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 4406-15 (2d ed. 2002).

See generally id. §§ 4416-26.
See generally 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4261. This result may not hold for
review of federal convictions in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Rule 1 of the
Rules Governing Section 2255 Adv. Cmt. Note ("[A] motion under § 2255 is a further step
in the movant's criminal case and not a separate civil action .. ").If the governing state
law also provides for a state habeas collateral challenge to the state conviction, then there
may be three distinct cases. The binary conception still applies. E.g., S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1 (c)
("An application filed under the [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure] Act is an independent civil action which should be separately filed and indexed by the clerk of court.").
116
At first blush, this might seem somewhat anomalous because the entire proceeding
might constitute a single case were the victorious party simply to seek enforcement of judgment from the issuing court as part of the original case. However, the fact still remains
that a court must have proper, independent subject natterjurisdiction over a separate case
seeking enforcement of ajudgment previously entered by that court, even if the court would
have had ancillary jurisdiction had the victorious party sought to enforce the judgment as
part of the original proceeding. See Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 355 (1996) ("In a
subsequent lawsuit involving claims with no independent basis for jurisdiction, a federal
court lacks the threshold jurisdictional power that exists when ancillary claims are asserted
in the same proceeding as the claims conferring federal jurisdiction.").
114
115
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cases, usually before two distinct courts.1 17 The jurisdiction each
court enjoys over the case before it is wholly independent of the other
court's jurisdiction. The mere fact that the first court has decided to
suspend proceedings in the case before it does not disturb its jurisdiction over that case,'ls and the second court's jurisdiction is independent from the first court's jurisdiction, even if the first court
contemplated that the second court's case would be filed or if it directed that it be filed.
B.

Contours of the Unitary Conception

The unitary conception describes situations where there is a single case with different courts exercising jurisdiction over the case at
different times. In effect, jurisdiction begins in one court, and then a
'jurisdictional wave," propagated by the original court's jurisdiction,
shifts jurisdiction to another court, and then possibly back to the original court (or to other courts altogether).
One simple example of a situation described by the unitary conception is a case where one judge assumes responsibility from another
judge. In such a situation, the case over which the second judge assumes responsibility is clearly the same as the case over which the first
judge had responsibility. In these situations, the second judge generally will follow the rulings of the firstjudge under the "law of the case"
doctrine. 119
Another simple example of a situation described by the unitary
conception is that of transfer of venue by one federal court to another.12 0 Again, the case before the second federal court is clearly the
same as the one that originated before the first federal court. Thus,
the second federal court's subject matter jurisdiction is derivative of
that of the first. While one might argue that the second federal court
necessarily would have independent subject matter jurisdiction if the
first court had jurisdiction, the fact that the second court's jurisdiction
is resultant of the first court's jurisdiction (i.e., that there is in fact a
117

See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997) (noting

that Pullman abstention "entail[s] a full round of litigation in the state court system");
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390 (1974) (describing abstention as involving "[remission of] the parties to a state tribunal for the start of another lawsuit"). But see ERWIN
CHEMERINSKy, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 12.3, at 760 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that under Pullman abstention, "[t]he federal court stays its proceedings and sends the case to state court
for a ruling on the state law question" (emphasis added)).
118
See England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415-19 (1964).
119
See supra note 88.
120
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000) (authorizing transfer of venue from one district
where venue is proper to another district of proper venue based upon a balancing of the
equities); id. § 1406(a) (authorizing transfer of venue when the venue is improper in the
district where the case was brought); id. § 1631 (authorizing transfer of venue to cure a
lack of jurisdiction in the transferor court).
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single case) is aptly demonstrated by the fact that the second court
does not treat the case it receives as newly filed. The second court
applies the "law of the case" doctrine, 12 1 and it examines statutes of
limitation from the date that the original court action was filed, not
122
the date of transfer.
A third simple example of a situation described by the unitary
conception is that of a direct appeal. Jurisdiction originally vests in
the trial court. Upon appeal, jurisdiction as to matters falling within
the scope of the appeal shifts to the appellate court. 123 The appellate
court's jurisdiction is derivative or resultant of the trial court's original
jurisdiction. The appellate court must have appellate jurisdiction, but
its jurisdiction rests upon, and is nonexistent without, the lower
court's jurisdiction. This is true even in a case where a party appeals a
lower court ruling which holds that there is no jurisdiction. In such a
case, the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the issue of whether or
not it has proper jurisdiction,124 and the appellate court's jurisdiction
is derivative of that jurisdiction.
The unitary conception continues to apply if the appellate court
remands the case to the lower court either for entry of judgment or
for further proceedings. 25 The unitary conception views this as yet
121 E.g., Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815-17 (1988)
(holding that the transferee court should apply the law of the case doctrine to the transfer
decision by the transferor court); see 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3827, at 276 (2d ed.
1986) ("The doctrine of law of the case applies to transfer orders under [28 U.S.C.]
§ 1406(a) as it does to other interlocutory orders." (footnote omitted)). See generally supra
note 88 (addressing the law of the case doctrine).
122
E.g., Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 467 (1962).
123
SetGriggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) ("The filing of a
notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance-it confers jurisdiction on the
court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case
involved in the appeal."). The fact that some matters, specifically those unrelated to the
appeal, may remain within the district court's jurisdiction does not render the unitary conception inapplicable, since those are the very issues that do not fall within the appellate
court'sjurisdiction. See generally Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1337-38 (7th Cir. 1989).
124 See, e.g., Home Says. Bank, F.S.B. v. Gillam, 952 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991);
13A WRIc HT Er AL., supra note 8, § 3536, at 535 (2d ed. 1984).
125 See, e.g., Kusay v. United States, 62 F.3d 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1995) (Just as the notice
of appeal transfers jurisdiction to the court of appeals, so the mandate returns it to the
district court. Until the mandate issues, the case is 'in' the court of appeals, and any action
by the district court is a nullity." (citation omitted)).
In limited circumstances, such as where the appellate court requires clarification from
the trial court in order to determine whether appellate jurisdiction properly lies, an appellate court may remand a case to the trial court while retaining jurisdiction pending the
trial court's compliance with its mandate. See generally 16 WRIGiI r ET AL., supra note 8,
§ 3937.1 (2d ed. 1996). This procedure simply obviates the need for a litigant to file a new
notice of appeal once the trial court has fulfilled its mandate in cases where the appellate
court knows at the time of remand that it will again consider the appeal. See id. § 3937.1, at
704-05 (citing United States v.Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994)). Even if the two courts
retain jurisdiction over aspects of the case, the fact remains that the two courts do not act
simultaneously with respect to the same matter. While this procedure may be seen as akin
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another shift in jurisdiction, again beginning with the trial court's
original jurisdiction. The same holds if a party appeals the appellate
court's determination to a superior court. In short, multiple shifts in
jurisdiction are entirely consistent with the unitary conception.
Whether the direct appeal is within or outside the court system of
which the trial court is a part does not affect application of the unitary
conception. Thus, the direct appeal of a state court case to the
United States Supreme Court falls within the scope of the unitary conception. The Supreme Court is hearing an appeal of the very case in
which the state trial court entered judgment and as to which state
appellate courts conducted review. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction
26
rests upon, and is absent without, the state courts' jurisdiction.
The unitary conception also governs if the Supreme Court, in
hearing an appeal of a decision from a state supreme court, remands
the case to the state court for the sole purpose of clarifying its decision. The Supreme Court has taken such action on rare occasions in
order to determine the extent to which the state court decision relied
upon federal law in reaching its decision, so that the Supreme Court
can determine the propriety of hearing the case.1 27 In such a circumstance, the state court receives back from the Supreme Court the very
case that it previously decided and that has been appealed to the Supreme Court. The fact that the state court's freedom to act is severely
circumscribed is unimportant: The situation is similar to that of a trial
court that receives a case back from an appellate court with a narrow
mandate.
The procedural doctrine of intrajurisdictional certification of
questions of law bears significant resemblance to an appeal, and may
also be explained by reference to the unitary conception. Federal law
authorizes federal courts of appeals to certify "any question of law" to
to abstention (and therefore also as amenable to a binary conception), the better understanding is that the procedure is simply a legal fiction that allows the appellate court to
retain jurisdiction in name only in order to ensure that the district court does not exceed
the scope of its mandate. Thus, the procedure is quite distinct from abstention, where the
court in respect of which the first court abstains is free to adjudicate the independent case
before it as it sees fit.
126 This is especially clear where the Supreme Court reviews a state court judgment in
a case in which the Article III standing requirements would have precluded a federal court
from hearing the underlying case in the first instance. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490
U.S. 605, 623-24 (1989), holding that
[w]hen a state court has issued a judgment in a case where plaintiffs in the
original action had no standing to sue under the principles governing the
federal courts, we may exercise our jurisdiction on certiorari if the judgment of the state court causes direct, specific, and concrete injury to the
parties who petition for our review, where the requisites of a case or controversy are also met.

127 See, e.g., Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (remanding the case to the Florida Supreme Court for a clarification of the precise grounds
for the state high court's decision).
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the United States Supreme Court. '2 8 The federal judicial code provides that, "upon such certification the Supreme Court may give binding instructions or require the entire record to be sent up for decision
of the entire matter in controversy."'' 2t 1 The Supreme Court Rules expand upon this certification procedure. Rule 19(1) provides:
A United States court of appeals may certify to this Court a
question or proposition of law on which it seeks instruction for the
proper decision of a case. The certificate shall contain a statement
of the nature of the case and the facts on which the question or
proposition of law arises. Only questions or propositions of law may
13
be certified ....
The rule explains that the Supreme Court has discretion to order a
case "briefed, set for argument, or dismissed, "' - and that the Court,
"on its own motion or that of a party, may consider and decide the
13 2
entire matter in controversy."
Certification to the United States Supreme Court is rarely used
and today is virtually a dead letter. 133 Nonetheless, the scant jurisprudence surrounding this procedure suggests that this form of certification is best explained by a unitary conception. First, the Supreme
Court has held that it exercises its constitutional appellate jurisdiction' 3 4 when it determines questions on certification from a federal
court of appeals.13 5 Second, since in any case in which it accepts certi128 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2000). The Supreme Court's certification jurisdiction dates
back to 1802. See 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4038, at 103 (2d ed. 1988). Congress
initially authorized certification to the Supreme Court by the cotrts of appeals when it
created the courts of appeals in 1891. See Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26
Stat. 826. For a brief historical overview, see Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari:
Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1643, 1650-57

(2000).
129
130
131
132
133

28 U.S.C. § 1254(2).
S. CT.R. 19(1).
S. CT. R. 19(3).
S. CT. R. 19(2).
"[l]n recent years only three [Supreme Court] cases have been decided on certi-

fied questions. Although outright repeal has been recommended, it would be little more
than an official obituary." 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4038, at 102-03 (2d ed. 1988)
(footnotes omitted). Edward Hartnett argues that the Supreme Court discouraged lower
courts from certifying questions, and that the practical elimination of intrajurisdictional
certification undermined the original congressional intention to have the lower federal
courts share the role of controlling the content of the Supreme Court's docket with the
highest court. See Hartnett, supra note 128, at 1710-12.
114 See U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 2, cl.2.
135
See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 (1996) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (describing
the Court's consideration of questions certified to it by a federal court of appeals as an
exercise of the Court's "appellate jurisdiction"); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S.
716, 728-29 (1929) ("The certification of . . . a question by the [c]ircuit [c]ourt of
[a] ppeals is an invocation of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and therefore within
the Constitution."); cf Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281 U.S.
572, 576 (1930), holding that
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fication the Supreme Court has discretion to decide the entire case
(instead of limiting its action to deciding the specific questions certified), it must be that the Court in all certified cases takes jurisdiction
13 6
over the very case that was before the court of appeals.
The unitary conception also describes the role of Article I decisionmakers-specifically federal magistrate judges137 and bankruptcy
judges' - 8-in handling cases filed in federal court. Federal law allows
district courts to refer certain matters to these individuals.' 39 In some
to accept [from the court of original jurisdiction] a certification and proceed to a determination thereon, in advance of a decision by that court,
would be an exercise of original jurisdiction by this Court contrary to the
constitutional provision which prescribes that its jurisdiction shall be appellate in all cases other than those affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party. (citing U.S.
CONST. art. 1II, § 2, cl. 2).
136
It might be argued that this point cuts the other way, that is, that certification to
the United States Supreme Court is, like Pullman abstention, better explained by reference
to a binary conception ofjurisdiction. One could argue that since the Supreme Court is
under no obligation to preserve the case in the form in which it was certified by the federal
court of appeals for final resolution (just as in Pullman abstention cases), the Supreme
Court is in the same position as state courts, which generally are under no obligation to
preserve the federal court case. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. The salient
point, however, is not that the Supreme Court is under no obligation to preserve the case in
the form that it was certified, but rather that the choices available to the United States
Supreme Court on certification, and a state court hearing a case while a federal court
abstains under the Pullman doctrine, are quite different.
Once it accepts certified questions from a federal court of appeals, the United States
Supreme Court has two distinct options. In the typical case in which the Supreme Court
opts simply to answer the questions certified, it does indeed preserve the case (other than
the legal questions that it answers) for ultimate decision by the federal court of appeals
(allowing, however, for the possibility of remand to the district court, and of subsequent
Supreme Court review). See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 689 & n.6 (1964).
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court elects to decide the entire matter in controversy,
it may do so to the exclusion of the court of appeals; there may be nothing left for the
certifying court of appeals to do. See, e.g., Alison v. United States, 344 U.S. 167, 170 (1952).
By contrast, a state court acting while a federal court abstains has many options. Indeed, the only constraint on the state court's action is that the plaintiff in the federal court
case may reserve disposition of any federal law matters for the federal court to decide in
the federal case. SeeEngland v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1964)
(discussing right of party to federal court case where federal court has abstained pending
resolution of state court case to reserve issues of federal law for resolution in federal
court). In general, unlike Supreme Court certification, a state court typically does not preserve issues for disposition by the abstaining federal court. Cf 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 8, § 4248, at 26 (2d ed. Supp. 2002) ("The expectation on certification is that there
will be further proceedings in federal court in the light of the state court's answers to the
questions." (footnote omitted)). Moreover, even if the state court acts to the full extent of
its jurisdiction and decides all the issues before it, that does not necessarily mean that the
federal court will have nothing left to do in the federal court case. In other words, unlike
the Supreme Court, the state high court does not enjoy the absolute prerogative to decide
all pending issues to the exclusion of the federal court.
137
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (2000).
138
See id. §§ 151-158.
139
Section 636(b) of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Code authorizes district
judges to "designate" magistrate judges to hear certain matters. See id. § 636(b) (1) (A).
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instances, the magistrate judge or bankruptcy judge issues a report
that, upon objection of one of the parties, the district court reviews de
novo. 141 1 In other instances, they will issue a final order that the dis41
trict court reviews for clear error upon a party's objection.
In such circumstances, the magistrate judge or bankruptcy judge

handles the same case that was filed in federal district court, and it is
that same case that is returned to the district court after the judge's
involvement. This is made clear by the language used by Congress in
the statutes that establish magistrate and bankruptcy judges as adjuncts to the district court.1 42 The fact that Congress has authorized
district courts to review the findings and recommendations issued by
magistrate and bankruptcy judges 143 also indicates congressional understanding that these judges handle the very cases that are pending
before the district court. Further, the Supreme Court has considered,
and rejected, the notion that magistrate judges improperly exercise
the Article III federal judicial power when undertaking certain
tasks; 144 if the Court understood magistrate judges to be presiding
Section 157 allows district courts to refer to bankruptcy judges "any or all cases under title
II and any or allproceedings arising under title II or arising in or related to a case under
title
11." Id.§ 157(a).
140
See id. § 157(c)(1) (regarding bankruptcy judges); id. § 636(b) (1)(B), (C) (regarding magistrate judges).
141
See id. § 157(b), 158(a) (bankruptcy judges); id. § 636(b)(])(A) (magistrate
judges).
Section 158(b) (1) allows, in the alternative, for appeals of bankruptcyjudges' determinations to be heard, with the consent of the parties, by a "bankruptcy appellate panel"
consisting of three bankruptcy judges from districts located within the circuit. See id.
§ 158(b) (1). Section 158(b) creates a presumption in favor of the establishment of bankruptcy appellate panels in each circuit, but ultimately leaves it to the discretion of each
circuit to decide whether or not to establish such panels. See id. § 158(b) (1) (A)-(B). The
§ 158(b) presumption notwithstanding, many circuits have yet to establish bankruptcy appellate panels. See Eugene R. Wedoff, BAPs-Good, but Not Good Enough, 19 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 32, 32 (2000). Appeals from bankruptcy appellate panels are heard by the court of
appeals for the jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).
Section 636(c) allows magistrate judges to preside (as a districtjudge would) over jury
or nonjury civil proceedings with the consent of the parties. See id. § 636(c). Appeals from
judgments entered by magistrate judges under section 636(c) are heard by the court of
appeals for the jurisdiction. Id. § 636(c) (3).
142
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 151 ("In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular
active service shall constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy
court for that district."); id. § 636(b) (1) (A) (authorizing a district judge to designate a
magistrate judge to hear and determine certain pretrial matters "pending before the

court").
See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
E.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936-37 (1991) (holding that a magistrate's supervision of voir dire for a felony trial with consent of parties did not violate
Article Ill because (i) litigants may waive the right to voir dire supervision by an Article III
judge and (ii) the magistrate acted as an adjunct to the district court); United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683 (1980) (concluding that a magistrate's handling of an evidentiary suppression hearing, subject to the district court's review of the magistrate's recommended determination, did not violate Article Ill because "the ultimate decision is made
143

144
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over a separate Article I case, there would have been no Article III
issue for the Court to address in the first place. Conversely, the Court
held that, under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, with only appellate review available in an Article III court, 145 a bankruptcy judge's
adjudication of a state law contract claim violated Article 111.146 This
confirms that magistrate and bankruptcy judges indeed preside over
the very cases which were originally filed in the federal district court
when cases are referred to them.
The jurisdictional setting of the procedural device of removal
also falls within the scope of the unitary conception. When a case
brought originally in state court is removed to federal court, the latter
court's removal jurisdiction results from the state court's original jurisdiction over the claim. Thus, the federal court's jurisdiction does not
result from the filing of a complaint and the invocation of the court's
original jurisdiction, but rather arises upon the accomplishment of
three steps: filing a notice of removal in federal court, filing a copy of
that notice in state court, and giving prompt written notice to all adverse parties of the removal. 147 That the federal court exerts jurisdicby the district court"); id. at 685 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the use of
magistrates does not violate Article III because "the only conceivable danger of a 'threat' to
the 'independence' of the magistrate comes from within, rather than without, the judicial
department"). See generally Mag. Judges Div. of the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, A
ConstitutionalAnalysis of MagistrateJudge Authority, 150 F.R.D. 247 (1993).
145
See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 55 (1982)
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (stating that appeals from bankruptcy judges' rulings
would be heard by panels of bankruptcy judges if so designated by the chiefjudge of the
circuit, and otherwise by the district court (appeals from rulings of bankruptcy appellate
panels or from district courts would be heard by the court of appeals)).
146
See id. at 76-87 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (finding that the role of the bankruptcy judge violated Article III because the Article I bankruptcy judge was not acting
merely as an adjunct to the district court); id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (agreeing
with the majority on the narrow ground that the role of the bankruptcy judge in question
violated Article III).
147 See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), (d) (2000); Anthony v. Runyon, 76 F.3d 210, 213-14 (8th
Cir. 1996). Not all federal courts have adhered to this standard. See 14C WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 8, § 3737, at 381-83 (3d ed. 1998). A few courts have held that removal is
effective simply upon the filing of a notice of removal with the federal court. See, e.g.,
Berberian v. Gibney, 514 F.2d 790, 792 (1st Cir. 1975). This approach seems irreconcilable
with the plain language of section 1446(d). See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2000) (stating that
the filing of a copy of the notice in state court and the giving of notice to all adverse parties
"shall effect the removal"); see 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3737, at 382 (3d ed.
1998); cf Medrano v. Texas, 580 F.2d 803, 804 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that notice to state
court need not be actual, but may be merely constructive, to effect removal).
Some federal courts have further held that, while the state court is divested ofjurisdiction upon satisfaction of all three steps, merely filing a notice of removal in federal court
establishes removal jurisdiction in the federal court without divesting the state court of
jurisdiction. In other words, until the satisfaction of the remaining two steps, there is concurrent jurisdiction in both state and federal court. See, e.g., Berbierian, 514 F.2d at 792-93
("[J]urisdiction of the federal court attaches as soon as the petition for removal is filed
with it, and ... both state and federal courts have jurisdiction until the process of removal
is completed."); Burroughs v. Palumbo, 871 F. Supp. 870, 872 (E.D. Va. 1994) ("[F]ederal
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tion over the same case which had been before the state court is amply
demonstrated by the fact that, under statute, "[a]ll injunctions, orders, and other proceedings had in such action prior to its removal
shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the
'
district court."

148

The federal district court to which a state case is removed must
entertain, within thirty days of removal, motions to remand the case
back to state court on the basis of technical deficiencies in the removal procedure. 149 Also, the federal court must remand the case
"[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
jurisdiction attached when the notice of removal was filed in federal court.., and.., state
court jurisdiction continued until the notice was filed in state court ....");see also 14C
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3737, at 382-83 (3d ed. 1988) (stating that there is "authority" for this "reasonable intermediate conclusion"). However, the reasoning employed below to discredit the use of the unitary conception for certification when the doctrine is
facing constitutional challenge, see infra text accompanying notes 209-13, indicates that
this interpretation may not be reasonable after all. Under the unitary (single case) conception of removal, the state court would improperly have jurisdiction over a case that falls
within the federal Article III judicial power. This means that (as is the case with certification) resort to the binary conception is required to defend the procedure. However,
caselaw addressing the removal procedure does not allow for the use of the binary conception outside of the concurrent jurisdiction theory. Moreover, even the cases that allow for
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction speak of concurrent jurisdiction over a single
case, not of each court having jurisdiction over its own distinct case. Thus, the unitary
conception should apply to the removal procedure's jurisdictional setting; the satisfaction
of the three steps effects removal of the entire case from state court to federal court. Cf
Erkins v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 866 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (N.D. Ala. 1994) (describing
as a "fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of federal removal jurisdiction" the
notion that "some but not all of the state case was removed to [federal] court and that
some portion remains within the jurisdiction of the state court").
For a discussion of a similar question, the timing of the resumption of sole state court
jurisdiction when a federal court remands a case that was removed from state court, see
David A. Furlow & Charles W. Kelly, Removal and Remand: Mien Does a Federal District Court
Lose Jurisdiction over a Case Remanded to State Court?, 41 Sw. LJ. 999 (1987).
148
28 U.S.C. § 1450 (2000). Section 1450's effect may be quite limited as a result of
the time limitations on removal. See id. § 1446(b) (providing time limits requiring removal
of civil actions soon after filing). There are, however, some provisions that allow more
time in which to remove a case. See, e.g., id. § 1441(d) (providing, in suits against foreign
states, that "the time limitations of section 1446(b) of this chapter may be enlarged at any
time for cause shown"); id. § 1446(c) (1) (providing that notice of a removal of a criminal
prosecution must be filed no later than thirty days "after the arraignment in the State
court, or at any time before trial, whichever is earlier, except that for good cause shown the
United States district court may enter an order grantingthe defendant or defendants leave to file the
notice at a later timd' (emphasis added)). Moreover, some federal courts of appeals have
held that, under a special provision which allows the Resolution Trust Corporation to remove to federal court any case in which it is a party, see 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(3) (2000),
cases can be removed at any time, even after judgment has been entered by the state court. In
these cases, the federal courts of appeals consider the state court judgment valid, subject
only to ordinary post judgment remedies by the losing party. See, e.g.,
Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Allen, 16 F.3d 568, 573 (4th Cir. 1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Nernberg, 3 F.3d
62, 67-69 (3d Cir. 1993).
149
See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

2003]

FEDERAL COURT POWER TO CERTIFY

1711

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction."' 150 The fact that remand is appropriate in a particular case does not necessarily render the unitary
conception inapplicable. Instead, the jurisdictional wave simply proceeds from the state court to the federal court, and then back again.
Although the issue is more complicated, the unitary conception is
not necessarily inapplicable in cases in which removal jurisdiction
exists notwithstanding improper state court jurisdiction. 15 1 In such
circumstances, the state court never ruled that it lacked jurisdiction.
Thus, at the time of removal, jurisdiction in the state court was effective, even if ultimately the state court ruled that its jurisdiction was
invalid.15- 2 Accordingly, it can be argued that federal removal jurisdiction is the result of that limited, original state court jurisdiction, 153
and, therefore, the removed federal action is a continuation of the
case initiated in state court.
C.

Amenability of Certification to the Binary and Unitary
Conceptions

Unlike other procedural devices that are aptly described by either
the binary or the unitary conception (but not both), certification is
amenable to both conceptions. This is due in large part to the common features that certification shares with both Pullman abstention 15 4
and intrajurisdictional certification of questions of law. 15 5 Because
the former doctrine is paradigmatic of the binary conception, and the
Id.
151
Removal jurisdiction- is proper in such cases: "The court to which a civil action is
removed ... is not precluded from hearing and determining any claim in such civil action
because the State court from which such civil action is removed did not have jurisdiction
over that claim." Id. § 1441(f).
152 At least the state court had, at the time of removal, jurisdiction to decide the issue
of whether its assertion ofjurisdiction over the case was proper. It can be said (though it is
perhaps not fully satisfying) that federal removal jurisdiction is resultant of this limited
jurisdiction, just as federal appellate jurisdiction can be resultant of lower court jurisdiction even if the appellate court reviews a decision by a lower court in which jurisdiction was
absent. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
15Prior to the 1986 addition of subsection (e) to section 1441, an action was removable only if it was within the subject matter jurisdiction of the state court in which the action
was commenced. See 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3721, at 304-05 (3d ed. 1998).
This requirement was called the "derivative jurisdiction principle." Id. § 3721, at 304 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the description of federal removal jurisdiction
being the result of the state court's initial jurisdiction is unrelated to the now defunct
principle of derivative jurisdiction. Id. § 3721, at 305-06.
154
Cf LeBel, supra note 19, at 1003 ("[T]he exercise of placing certification within the
broader categories of adjudicatory techniques with which it shares some key features sharpens the focus on the ways in which certification differs from closely analogous techniques
such as Pullman abstention."). The doctrine of Pullman abstention is discussed above. See
supra Part I.B.1.
155
Intrajurisdictional certification is discussed above. See supra text accompanying
notes 128-36.
150
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latter is aptly described by the unitary conception, both conceptions
find support in certification jurisprudence.
It is analytically helpful to consider the support for each conception of certification found in three categories: procedural aspects, the
perspective of the federal court that certifies questions to the state
high court, and the perspective of the state high court that considers
the certified questions.
1. ProceduralAspects
a.

Unitary Conception

The unitary conception of certification draws support from the
differences in the roles of the state judiciary with respect to certification and Pullman abstention. As discussed above, a state court dealing
with certified questions enjoys limited powers.-15 " For example, it generally engages in no factfinding, 15 7 and has no power to do that which
a state court exercising plenary jurisdiction could do in a case filed in
58
state court from which a federal court abstained under Pullman.1
The upshot is that a state high court acting on certification has no
authority to disturb the fundamental structure of the federal case.
Rather, it must preserve the status of the singular case while it is in its
1 59
custody so that it can return the case to the federal court intact.
This suggests that the case before the state high court and that before
the federal court are one and the same.
b.

Binary Conception

The procedural arguments in support of the unitary conception
are not conclusive. The limitations on the state high court's powers
can be understood as a voluntary accommodation to the federal
courts to provide, with ease and relative speed, dispositive answers to
1.6 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
157 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
158 A state high court exercising standard appellate review (even over a case in the
state court system while a federal court abstains over a parallel federal case) has limited
powers. For example, it can overturn factual findings made below, under the usual standard for appellate review of factual findings. See, e.g., In re T.A.G., 39 P.2d 686, 687 (Mont.
2002). Nevertheless, it is clear that the powers of a state high court on certification are
even more circumscribed. Moreover, the powers of the state court system taken as a whole
are even more limited under certification, because the state court system does not enjoy
plenary powers, as it would in a case brought in state court while a federal court exercised
Pullman abstention with respect to factual matters underlying the state law issues as well as
issues with respect to which no federal court reservation had been taken. See England v.
La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 417, 420-22 (1964) (discussing right of parties
to have federal law issues, and factual issues related thereto, adjudicated in a federal forum, but also requiring parties explicitly to reserve this right in abstention cases).
159 See Wade H. McCree, Foreword, 23 WAYNE L. REv. 255, 262 (1977) (Certification
"preserves the benefits of the federal factfinding process for federal movants.").
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difficult, unanswered questions of state law, rather than as a recognition that the state and federal courts are dealing with a single case. I'
Moreover, there is procedural support for the binary conception.
In certification cases, federal courts act as though they are abstaining
from proceeding with the case on their docket while the state court
considers the certified questions. In other words, they refrain from
action while the state court considers the certified questions and, once
the state high court has responded, they follow the state court's interpretation of state law.
2.

Perspective of the Certifying Court
a.

Unitary Conception

The notion that it is the law of the case doctrine which requires
16
federal courts to follow state court answers to certified questions '
supports the unitary conception. A federal court's application of the
law of the case doctrine to a state court decision implies that both the
state and federal courts have been involved in one and the same case.
Also in accord with this view is language of federal courts regarding whether or not they will "certify the case" to the state high
court. 162 Although this is largely a matter of semantics, and as such is
160
See infra text accompanying notes 264-65 (arguing that, in theory, state high courts
are free under the binary conception of certification to make factual findings).
161
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
162
See, e.g., Peerman v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 35 F.3d 284, 286-87 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e see

no need to certify this case to the Indiana Supreme Court ....
(emphasis added)); United
States ex rel. Farmers Home Admin. v. Kennedy (In re Kennedy), 785 F.2d 1553, 1557 (11 th
Cir. 1986) ("Since the only issue remaining to be resolved is a novel question of state law,
we think it proper to certify this case." (emphasis added)); United States v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 729 F.2d 735, 737 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Since the only issues remaining to be resolved are
novel questions of state law, we think it proper to certify this case." (emphasis added)); Gen.
Tel. Co. of the Southeast v. Trimm, 706 F.2d 1117, 1120 (11 th Cir. 1983) (" [W] e certify this
case to the Georgia Supreme Court for a resolution of this and other state law questions."
(emphasis added)); Miree v. United States, 565 F.2d 1354, 1355 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[W]e
certify this case to the Georgia Supreme Court." (emphasis added)); Wansor v. George
Hantscho Co., 570 F.2d 1202, 1208 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[W]e certify this case to the Georgia
Supreme Court for a resolution of this and other state law questions." (emphasis added));
Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Lee County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 467 F.2d 447, 448 (5th Cir. 1972)
(noting that it had "previously certified this case to the Supreme Court of Florida" (emphasis added)); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 475 (1987) (Powell,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("I therefore would vacate the judgment below and remand
with instructions to certify the case to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to allow it to
interpret the intent requirement of this ordinance." (emphasis added)).
It is interesting to note that, of all the federal courts of appeals, the Fifth Circuit and
the Eleventh Circuit (which split off from the Fifth Circuit in 1981, see Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 3, 94 Stat. 1995; Bonner v.
City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 th Cir. 1981) (en banc)) speak most often of certifying a
case. Because Florida was the first state to have a certification procedure in place, the Fifth
Circuit was the first to make significant use of certification procedure and as such was at
the forefront of the certification frontier. See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4248, at
160-62.
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far from conclusive, this language nonetheless reflects to some degree
the view of these federal courts; they are not certifying only questions
of state law to the state high court, but instead entire cases.
Further supporting the unitary conception is that federal courts
see themselves as initiating the certification process; it is the federal
courts, not the parties, who certify cases (or questions) to state
courts. 16 3 In some cases, federal courts have decided to invoke certifi1 4
cation sua sponte. 6

Consistent with the foregoing, federal courts generally refer to
5
abstention and certification as separate and distinct doctrines.'" Although again largely a matter of semantics, this also reflects some federal courts' understanding of certification as distinct from
abstention-the paradigm of a binary conception of jurisdiction.
In Lehman Bros. v. Schein, the Supreme Court held that Pullman
abstention requires federal courts to "remit[ ] the parties to a state
tribunal for the start of another lawsuit."16 6 The Court concluded that
Pullman abstention was unavailable pursuant to Meredith, yet proceeded to recommend that the lower court consider certification on
remand. In so holding, the Court seems to have implicitly distinguished certification from Pullman abstention on the ground that the
167
former does not entail the "start of another lawsuit."'
163
164

See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.

165
See, e.g., Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 839 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that previous cases had "discussed abstention as well as certification"); Fleet Bank, Nat'l
Ass'n v. Burke, 160 F.3d 883, 892 (2d Cir. 1998) (suggesting that a court should "consider
•. .whether the uncertain nature of state law warrants abstention, or perhaps certification"); Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d 235, 238 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[The] state interest in
having state courts resolve difficult questions of state law is recognized in the practice of
certification ... and in the various forms of federal abstention ...." (citations omitted));
see also Nemours Found. v. Manganaro Corp., New Eng., 878 F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 1989)
(rejecting the contention that "a certification order is a species of abstention" and, as such,
is immediately appealable).
166 416 U.S. 386, 390 (1974) (emphasis added).
167
Id. One might read this comment to mean that Pullman abstention entails the start
of another lawsuit, while certification entails the start of something else, something less
than a full fledged lawsuit, but some form of independent legal proceeding in state court.
One also might read the comment to emphasize that abstention remits "the parties" to a
state tribunal where "the parties" start a lawsuit, while under certification it is the certifying
court, not the parties, that commences the proceedings. See id. (emphasis added). These
different emphases are supported by the juxtaposition, which the Court employed in
Arizonansfor Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997), of Pullman abstention which the
Court found to "entail[ ] a full round of litigation in the state court system before any
resumption of proceedings in federal court," with certification which the Court found to
"allow[ ] a federal court faced with a novel state-law question to put the question directly to
the [s]tate's highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and increasing the assurance of gaining an authoritative response." Id. at 76. Nevertheless, the plainest interpretation of Schein is that advanced in the text above.
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Finally, a survey of members of the judiciary reveals that "[m] ost
[federal] circuit judges (92%) . . . [and] district judges (86%) ...

disagree that sending a certified question of law to another court
amounts to a 'surrender' of control over that case."' 168 These results
reflect an understanding that there is one case, over which two courts
exercise jurisdiction, but over which the federal court retains
control. 169
b.

Binary Conception

The arguments set forth immediately above-that some federal
courts may perceive of certification as falling within the unitary conception-are hardly conclusive. Reliance on the law of the case doctrine to justify following state court responses to certified questions is
by far the minority position. 71 Most federal courts rely upon the Erie
doctrine instead.' 7' Similarly, most federal courts that invoke certification speak of certifying questions rather than cases. 172 In addition,
168 GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 105, at 60. The vast majority of state justices (85%) also
disagree with this proposition. Id.
The same survey reveals that "[s]izeable majorities of circuit judges (69%), district
judges (66%), and state justices (75%) disagree with the proposition that parties who remove their cases to the federal courts 'should not be allowed to seek certification of questions of law."' Id. at 64. This finding also supports the inference that judges consider a
case where a federal court certifies questions of law to a state high court to remain, at all
times, a unitary case subject to the jurisdiction of the federal court. If federal judges considered certification to result in an independent state court proceeding, then they would
be more likely to object when a litigant acted to remove a case from state courtjurisdiction,
only later to seek the jurisdiction of the state court to resolve some of the same issues. By
contrast, if judges perceive a case in which questions are certified as remaining one case
before the federal court, then the objection is less well-founded.
169
One could argue that the survey's findings indicate that a state high court's action
involves another aspect of the dispute between the parties, so that the case pending in
federal court remains there and, accordingly, no surrender of control occurs. However,
the strength of this argument is decreased by another finding of the same survey that "[a]
substantial majority of circuitjudges (77%), district judges (74%), and state justices (66%)
disagreewith the proposition that certification 'creates piecemeal litigation."' Id. at 66.
170
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
171
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
172 See, e.g., Arizonansfor Official English, 520 U.S. at 77 (speaking of "certification of...
questions of state law" (emphasis added)); Richardson v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 170
F.3d 1264, 1264 (10th Cir. 1999) (captioning opinion with "CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONOF STATE LAW" (emphasis added)); Reagan v. Racal Mortgage, Inc., 135 F.3d 37,
45 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[W]e elect to certify this question to the Maine Supreme Court." (emphasis added)); Aguilar v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 117 F.3d 1368, 1369 (11 th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam) ("We therefore certify the question to the Supreme Court of Florida." (emphasis
added)); see also Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 914 (1st Cir.
1988) (en banc) (Bownes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), stating that
the majority of this court has confused the procedure of certifying questions of state law to a state court with the procedure of certifying entire
cases to state courts. Federal courts do not certify cases to state courts.
They certify questions of law and then apply the answers to those questions
to reach a result which represents the combined effect of majority, not minority, positions.
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the Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, has described a federal court that
7 3
certifies state law questions as "abstaini[ing] pending certification."'
Finally, to the extent that federal court initiation of certification is
problematic under the binary conception, this problem may be resolved by understanding federal courts to have final discretion only
over whether to abstain pending certification. Such an understanding
allows the parties to retain authority over whether to commence the
certification proceeding in state court. This analysis, however, seems
to clash with at least the wording of most federal court certification
orders.

74

Perhaps the greatest support for the binary conception of certification is the fact that federal courts understand state courts to be
under no obligation to respond to questions certified by federal
courts. State courts have discretion to decline to respond to certified
questions. 175 The traditional view is that federal courts lack the power
to compel state high courts to accept and respond to certified questions, 176 and several states do not even have a certification procedure.
The law thus suggests that the state court systems do not act as mere
adjuncts of the federal courts in certification cases. Rather, they enjoy
full autonomy over their dockets with respect to certification cases,
and federal courts respect that autonomy. This implies that federal courts
are of the opinion that, when state courts do accept certified questions, they do so purely under their own jurisdiction.
This argument proves too much, however. Congress can create
federal causes of action that the state courts are not at absolute liberty
to decline to adjudicate. 177 Thus, state court docket control over cases
arising under federal law is limited by Congress, yet there can be no
question that state courts hearing such cases are exercising purely
state, and not federal, jurisdiction. A state court's autonomy over its
docket, therefore, is not an absolute measure of whether the court is
operating under federal or state jurisdiction.
The question of whether a state court responds to individual questions or decides a
case as a whole affects the proper aggregation of votes where the federal court certifies
more than one question to the state court. On the topic of the proper way to aggregate
the votes of appellate judges, see generally Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting
Protocol Paradigmfor Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2003).
173 City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471 (1987) ("We therefore see no need in this
case to abstain pending certification"); see id. at 470-71 ("[T]he availability of certification
is not in itself sufficient to render abstention appropriate.").
174 See supra text accompanying notes 162-63.
175 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
176 This question remains unsettled. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
177 See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding that a Rhode Island state court
could not decline to hear action arising under federal law if court would hear similar actions arising under state law).
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Perspective of the Court Accepting Certification
a.

Unitary Conception

Although clearly in the minority, some state high courts understand their role with regard to certification to be that of an adjunct to
the certifying federal court, considering a singular case. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine offered the following explanation of certification, which embodies the unitary conception of certification:
With certification available the litigant is able to submit his federal
claims for decision by the federal Court and still enjoy the benefit
that both his federal and state claims will be settled in the substantial equivalent of a single lawsuit. It is likely that the litigant will
look upon the federal [c]ourt's certification, to the [state court] of
last resort, of the state law questions involved as, essentially, an aspect of the underlying federal [c]ourt proceedings ....178
This understanding accords with the United States Supreme
Court's understanding of its role where a federal court of appeals invokes certification to the federal high court. As described above, the
United States Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction over the very case
79
that was certified to it by the federal court of appeals.
b.

Binary Conception

The view expressed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in
the excerpt quoted above is the minority view. Most state high courts
have treated their dispositions of certified questions as unexceptional
exercises of their own jurisdiction, not as derivative of federal court
jurisdiction. 18 0 This suggests that most state courts understand consideration of certified questions as an exercise that is wholly independent from the federal court cases in which the questions arose.
There are several reasons why the state court majority view on this
point is not conclusive. First, no state high court has ever directly confronted the question of whether dispositions of certified questions
constitute exercises of federal jurisdiction. Second, the mere fact that
state courts have concluded that their dispositions of certified questions constituted exercises of their own jurisdiction does not preclude
the possibility that they are simultaneously exercising federal jurisdiction. Third, it is not clear that state courts have the authority to raise
17 8
179

"White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 668, 683 (Me. 1974).
See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 833 (Me. 1966) (state high court refers to the

180
state certification statute as "conferring jurisdiction upon us"); id. at 828-33 (determining
whether the state certification statute conforms with the state constitution's judicial provisions); see also Fischer v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 857 F.2d 4, 7 n.2 (lst Cir. 1988)
(describing a state statute authorizing certification as, inter alia, "a basis of jurisdiction" in
the state court).
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or address the issue of whether they are exercising federal jurisdiction, or that the state court is the proper forum in which such an issue
should be decided. Such a determination likely would lie outside the
state courts' proper scope of action on certification. Fourth, and
along the same lines, even if state courts had explicitly considered and
rejected the notion that they were exercising federal jurisdiction when
answering certified questions, it is clear that their determinations
would not be binding on the federal courts.' 8 1
Especially in light of the focus of this Article-that is, the federal
jurisdictional underpinnings of certification-the jurisdictional perspective of the state high courts that accept certified questions should
be accorded less weight than the other categories and factors discussed above. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court takes a different view of its role in certification (albeit under a different,
intrajurisdictional certification procedure). Thus, while this factor offers some support for a binary conception of certification, it is not
conclusive.
4.

Summary of the Three Factors

Consideration of the procedural aspects of certification, probably
the most important category addressed, weighs in favor of a unitary
conception of certification. Consideration of the perspective of certifying federal courts supports a binary conception. Finally, consideration of the perspective of the state courts that accept certification
offers some support for a binary conception, but this factor is due less
weight than the others. Thus, both conceptions are at least somewhat
descriptive of certification.
D.

The Limited Reconcilability of the Binary and Unitary
Conceptions

The preceding sections raise the question of whether, and to
what degree, the binary and unitary conceptions are reconcilable. As
an initial matter, there is no reason that either conception should be
wholly inapplicable in ajudicial system. Indeed, both conceptions apply to various jurisdictional procedural settings. This duality gives rise
to neither conflict nor tension. It is simply a matter of grouping one
set of procedural settings and devices under one category, and another set under a second category.
The analysis in section C suggested that perhaps certification,
which is alone among procedural devices and settings, could be described by both the unitary and the binary conceptions. However, the
two conceptions are internally irreconcilable. Therefore, both cannot
181

See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
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apply in describing any one procedural setting or device. This is because the two conceptions of certification offer considerably different
theories of the jurisdiction underlying certification: whether (i) the
federal and state courts enjoy jurisdiction over the same case, or (ii)
there are separate cases in the federal and state courts. Common
sense indicates that there simply cannot be a single case in the federal
and state courts, and separate cases in each court, at the same time.
Moreover, the two scenarios lead to antinomic rules. For example, under the unitary conception, a state court that accepts a certified
case acts under a limited mandate from the certifying federal court.
The state court is constrained from making any findings of fact. In
contrast, under the binary conception, the state court is in theory free
to engage in factfinding. If it does not do so, it is only because it has
chosen not to (whether on a case-by-case basis, or as a general rule
covering response to certified questions). Even if the state court does
engage in factfinding, the federal court presumably would be free to
ignore those factual findings to the extent that they might bear on any
issues before the federal court which were not the subject of the certi18 2
fied questions.
That the unitary and binary conceptions are internally irreconcilable is evidenced by the fact that no other procedural device or doctrine squares with both conceptions: each fits neatly under one
conception or the other. There is no reason to think that the doctrine of certification is or should be an outlier in this regard.
To explicate the limited irreconcilability of the unitary and binary
conceptions, it is helpful to compare the conceptions to, and distinguish them from, Richard Fallon's Federalist and Nationalist interpretive models. 183 The Federalist model sees the federal government as
limited to the powers assigned to it under the Constitution, with the
states retaining significant sovereign powers. 184 The Nationalist
model understands the Constitution to establish a "strong conception
of national supremacy that exalts federal interests."' 8 5 Fallon suggests
that one or the other of these guides underlies and explains many
decisions regarding federal courts law. He notes that the two models
rest on "antinomic premises"'18 6 and that "both models cannot be valid
• . . [because] each denies the most fundamental claims of the
182
Cf.England v.La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415-19 (1964) (discussing the right of a party to a federal court case to reserve issues of federal law for resolution
in federal court when the federal court has abstained pending resolution of the state court
case).
1835 See generally Fallon, supra note 96.
184 See generally id. at 1151-57 (describing the Federalist model).
185
Id. at 1158 (emphasis omitted). See generally id. at 1158-64 (describing the Nation-

alist model).
186
Id. at 1223.
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other." 17 Nonetheless, he observes that "Supreme Court decisions accept and legitimate the premises of both models." 's As a result, "federal courts law is contradictory and unstable at its foundations."'8 9 In
the end, he advocates the development of a moderate interpretive
model that navigates between the poles represented by the Nationalist
19
and Federalist models.
In one sense, the unitary and binary conceptions are more compatible than are the Federalist and Nationalist models. The unitary
conception applies to the doctrine of intrajurisdictional certification,
while the binary conception applies to the doctrine of abstention;
there is no contradiction, or even any tension, under that analysis. By
contrast, a decision arrived at under the Federalist model rests on
premises that a decision arrived at under the Nationalist model rejects; as such, there will be tension between the two decisions, even if
there is not an outright conflict.
However, in another sense, the unitary and binary conceptions
are less compatible than are the Federalist and Nationalist models.
The models are mere interpretive guides, while the conceptions determine the more concrete issue of which court has jurisdiction over
which case. Thus, while some decisions in a particular area of federal
courts law rest on the Federalist model and others on the Nationalist
model, which will lead to tension among those decisions, the decisions
need not be facially contradictory (for example, the Supreme Court
need not overrule all prior Nationalist based decisions when it issues a
Federalist based decision in the same area of law). In contrast, the
unitary and binary conceptions cannot apply concurrently to describe
a single jurisdictional setting or doctrine. Further, while Fallon can
recommend a moderate interpretive model that lies between the
poles of the Federalist and Nationalist models, it is difficult to imagine
how one might develop a conception for certification that lies between the unitary and binary conceptions.
For all these reasons, it is clear that the unitary and binary conceptions cannot apply at the same time to describe any one procedural device or setting. In particular, then, they cannot both describe
certification procedure.

187

188
189

Id.
Id.

Id.

190 See id. at 1228-31; seealso id. at 1231-48 (providing examples of "adjudication between the poles").
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III
EXAMINATION OF THE FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL
UNDERPINNINGS

OF CERTIFICATION

This Part examines two federal jurisdictional issues raised by certification: (i) Is certification consistent with constitutional limits on
federal court jurisdiction, and (ii) is certification consistent with Congress's statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts?
This Part argues that defense of certification against constitutional
challenge requires resort to a binary conception of certification. Although (as demonstrated below) a unitary conception of certification
offers the best lens through which to view certification as consistent
with the diversity grant, that option is unavailable insofar as reliance
on the binary conception is constitutionally required. This Part next
suggests approaches by which the second issue might be addressed
even under a binary conception of certification. This Part also addresses problems with those approaches. First, reliance upon the binary conception poses problems for the suggestion that the use of
certification in diversity cases should be expanded. Second, even if
reliance upon the binary conception is consistent with the letter of the
diversity statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the binary conception nonetheless frustrates the fundamental purpose of the federal
diversity jurisdiction.
A.

Does Certification Violate Article III of the U.S. Constitution?

At the center of the constitutional concerns raised by certification
is the fact that, under certification, federal jurisdiction is the trigger of
the state court's authority to act. That is, but for the initial case
brought under federal jurisdiction, there would be no case, and therefore no jurisdiction, in state court. 19' Thus, the state court jurisdiction is derivative of, and resultant from, the federal court jurisdiction.
Although the state high court exercises power over the litigants, it is
the federal court's certification that causes and allows the state court
to exercise such power.' 9 2 In other words, were the federal court to
decline to exercise its discretion and certify the question at issue, the
state court would have no authority to act.' 93 The question thus arises
191 Of course, it is possible that such a case could have initially been brought in state
court. However, the jurisdictional posture of, and freedom of the state court to act in a
case brought initially in state court (as opposed to a case on certification) are presumably
quite different. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
192
See Kitsap County v. Allstate Ins. Co., 964 P.2d 1173, 1178 (Wash. 1998) ("[W]e
recognize that when a federal court certifies a question to this court, this court answers
only the discrete question that is certified and lacks jurisdiclion to go beyond the question
presented." (emphasis added)).
193 Blasband v. Rales, 979 F.2d 324 (3d Cir. 1992), is instructive in this regard. There,
the district court initially rendered a decision in favor of defendants on the ground that
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whether a state court acting upon certification of questions of state
law by a federal court thereby exercises, in violation of Article III of
the Constitution, the federal judicial power.
The Constitution confines the 'judicial Power of the United
States" to "one supreme Court, and .

.

. such inferior Courts as the

Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."' 194 Because
state courts are not created by Congress and thus constitute judicial
systems entirely independent of and distinct from the federal judiciary,' 1 5 action by a state court upon certification of questions by a federal court is unconstitutional if the state court thereby exercises the
96
judicial power of the United States.1
plaintiff had failed to meet the governing standing requirements for a shareholder derivative suit under Delaware law. See Blasband ex rel. Danaher Corp. v. Rales, 772 F. Supp. 850
(D. Del. 1991), rev'd, 971 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1992). The district court reached this conclusion on its own, without certifying any questions to the Supreme Court of Delaware. On
appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, expressly concluding that plaintiff had met the relevant
standing requirements under Delaware law. Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1046 (3d
Cir. 1992). On remand, the district court decided to certify the issue of standing to the
Delaware Supreme Court because it disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion. See
Blasband, 979 F.2d at 325-26.
Dissatisfied with the district court's action, plaintiff petitioned the court for a writ of
mandamus. Id. at 326. The court of appeals granted the petition. Id. at 328. It reasoned
that the district court had exceeded its mandate on remand by choosing to employ
certification:
Whether the Delaware Supreme Court might have reached a different result if the derivative suit had been brought in the state courts, or if the
standing question had been certified to it before the district court dismissed the action, our opinion nevertheless was conclusive on the standing
point in the derivative suit.
Id.
Accordingly, the court of appeals issued an order directing the district court to vacate
its certification order, and to notify the Delaware Supreme Court that the request for certification was withdrawn. Regarding the response of the Delaware Supreme Court, the court
of appeals commented:
The Delaware Supreme Court became involved in the derivative suit only
because it was invited to do so by the district court. Then when the Supreme Court became aware of Blasband's petition, it stayed the certification proceedings. Accordingly, we cannot presume that if we issue a writ of
mandamus to the district court compelling it to withdraw its order of certification, the Supreme Court will continue the certification proceedings.
Id. at 327. And, indeed, upon receipt of the federal district court's order withdrawing the
certified question, the Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the certification proceedings.
See Rales v. Blasband, No. 410, 1992 WL 397477 (Del. Nov. 25, 1992) (referenced in table
of unpublished decisions at 620 A.2d 858 (Del. 1992)).
194
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
195
See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) ("The
federal [judicial] system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants who
properly invoke its jurisdiction."); Linn County v. City of Hiawatha, 311 N.W.2d 95, 97-99
(Iowa 1981) (discussing the different roles of state and federal courts in certification
cases).
196
But cf Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian

Cfompromise, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 39, 119-29 (arguing that some of the Framers, their contem-
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Threshold Questions

There are three threshold, and ultimately unpersuasive, arguments against the notion that a state court acting upon certified questions might be exercising federal jurisdiction. The first argument
asserts that federal jurisdiction clearly is not being exercised because
consideration of certified questions involves parties appearing before
a state court. How, this argument asks, can there be an exercise of
federal jurisdiction when the parties are appearing before a state
court?
The short answer to this question is that there can be no such
exercise of federal jurisdiction under the Constitution. This, however,
does not end the inquiry. The mere fact that the Constitution prohibits something does not mean that it cannot happen, only that its occurrence is unconstitutional. Thus, the first argument merely restates
the underlying question.
The second threshold argument is based on the fact that state
high courts accepting certified questions generally consider themselves to be acting only pursuant to state jurisdictional authority. 19 7
Why, this argument asks, is that not dispositive with regard to whether
state courts acting on certification exercise federal judicial power?
As set forth above (in the context of discussing why the majority
view of state courts with regard to certification does not dispositively
establish the validity of a binary conception 8), are several answers to
this question. These answers resonate loudly here because this subpart centers on federal jurisdiction, an issue on which state courts lack
authority to rule definitively. 199
The third threshold argument relies on the fact that state and
federal courts share concurrent jurisdiction over certain types of
cases, such as diversity and federal question cases.2 00 How, this arguporaries, and early members of Congress in fact understood the Constitution to allow for
the appointment of state judges to serve as members of the federal judiciary).
197
See suln/a text accompanying note 180.
198 See supra Part lI.C.3.b.
199 State courts are occasionally called upon to determine the scope of federal jurisdiction: for example, when determining whether a case brought in state court falls within
exclusive federal court jurisdiction, the state court must rule on the federal court's jurisdiction, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000) (establishing exclusive federal jurisdiction over admiralty claims). But any such determination is subject to Supreme Court review. Moreover, a
legal conclusion as to federal jurisdiction by a state court presumably would have no binding effect on a federal court. Cf Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800,
817-18 (1988) (holding that the Federal Circuit erred in accepting an appeal returned
from the Seventh Circuit after the Federal Circuit previously had concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction and transferred the appeal to the Seventh Circuit, and that the Seventh Circuit's reasoning was not binding on the Federal Circuit under a law of the case theory).
200
See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 826 (1990) (determining that federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions brought tinder
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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ment asks, can a state court improperly exercise the federal judicial
power by responding to certified questions when the state court system could have properly exercised jurisdiction over the entire case
had it been brought in state court in the first instance?

The mere fact that a state court exercises jurisdiction as to a case
that falls within the ambit of Article III does not render the exercise
constitutionally infirm. That this must be true is evident from the fact
that the Constitution does not require Congress to create any inferior
federal courts.2 1' Had Congress decided not to create any such inferior courts, the federal judicial power would be vested solely in the
United States Supreme Court, with state courts hearing all cases (except perhaps those falling within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction2t) 2) in the first instance.
Of course, Congress has decided to create inferior federal courts.
However, it has not seen fit to confer on the federal courts the full
extent of the federal judicial power authorized by Article 111,23 and
has generally allowed state courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction
over cases that the federal courts are authorized to hear.2114 It is clear
that state courts constitutionally exercise the federal judicial power
when they hear cases that either (i) fall within the ambit of Article III
yet do not fall within the federal courts' statutory subject matter jurisdiction, or (ii) fall within the ambit of Article III yet do not fall within
the federal courts' exclusive statutory subject matter jurisdiction.
See U.S. CONSr. art. 111, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." (emphasis added)); FALLON ET AL., supra note 43, at 7-9 (describing the evolution of the Madisonian Compromise, under which delegates to the constitutional convention agreed to establish a Supreme Court but left the establishment of lower
federal courts to the discretion of Congress). But see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 333-36 (1816) (Story, J.) (suggesting, in dicta, that the Constitution obligated Congress to create lower federal courts to the extent cases within Article IllI's ambit
fall neither within the original jurisdiction of state courts nor within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court); Collins, supra note 196 (questioning the force and meaning of
the Madisonian Compromise, and suggesting that many delegates to the constitutional
convention understood the Constitution to mandate the establishment of lower federal
tribunals).
202
See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2. In fact, Congress generally has not made the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction exclusive, see 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (b) (2000). It has conferred exclusive original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court only as to "controversies between two or more States," id. § 1251 (a). However, despite the language of § 1251 (b), the
Court has at times declined to hear cases falling within the ambit of that provision, in favor
of cases before other tribunals raising similar issues. See Louisiana v. Mississippi, 488 U.S.
990 (1988); Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976) (per curiam).
203
For example, as discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 224-27, the
statutory diversity jurisdiction conferred by Congress is narrower than the constitutional
diversity grant. Also, the Court has held that that Congress has not conferred by statute
the full scope of the constitutional federal question jurisdictional grant. See Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
See supra authority cited in note 200.
204
201
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The foregoing might seem to suggest that no case, with the possible exception of a case arising under the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction, truly falls within the federal judicial power. On reflection, however, that is not a valid statement: if Congress chooses (as it
in fact has) (i) to create inferior federal courts and (ii) to vest in those
courts some subset (whether proper or improper) of the Article III
judicial power, then a case proceeding in federal court under that
jurisdictional grant falls within the constitutional federal judicial
power. The question remains how a state court can exercise jurisdiction in such a case, consistent with the Constitution.
The fact that a federal court's exercise of such jurisdiction is not
mandatory does not resolve the issue. David Shapiro has demonstrated that federal courts have, in effect, read into almost every statutory jurisdictional grant the discretion to decline to hear cases that fall
facially within that grant. 20 5 One example of this is the federal court

authority, which is not found in any statute, to engage in Pullman abstention. 20 6 Shapiro's description and conception of federal court jurisdiction do not resolve the question currently under discussion
because certification may be seen, through the lens of the unitary conception, to differ from other instances in which a federal court defers
to another judicial system to resolve some or all of a case properly
before the federal court. 2°1 7 Declining jurisdiction completely, in

favor of allowing a distinct proceeding to be brought (or to proceed)
in another judicial system, is quite different from having the same proceeding continue in another judicial system and then return to federal
8

court.11

2.

State Court Jurisdictionin Certification Cases

It is thus clear that neither the fact that the consideration of certified questions involves parties appearing before a state court, nor the
fact that the state courts have treated their consideration of certified
questions as an exercise of their own jurisdiction, nor the fact that
state and federal courts share concurrent jurisdiction over many cases,
ends the constitutional fitness inquiry. It is therefore appropriate to
consider the question of whether state courts considering certified
questions are exercising some form of the federal judicial power,
which would necessarily be inappropriate. The answer to this ques205 See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L.Rv. 543 (1985). Shapiro also argues that such interpretations, and reasonably guided invocations of discretion
to decline federal jurisdiction, are appropriate. See id.
206 See id. at 551.
207
See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
208
Were this not the case, the concept of the federal judicial power would be quite
meaningless. Cf Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1943) (discussing the
duty of federal courts to hear cases falling within their diversity jurisdiction).
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tion depends upon whether certification is perceived under a unitary
or binary conception. As discussed above, support exists for both conceptions and neither can be pronounced definitively correct under
211
current certification jurisprudence.

9

Under a binary conception, the certifying federal court abstains
from proceeding on the case in federal court, while another (albeit
procedurally truncated) case is begun and concluded in state court.
Under the binary conception then, it seems clear that certification
does not result in state court exercise of the federal judicial power.
The result is far murkier under the unitary conception. The
mere fact that the unitary conception applies in a case which falls
under the jurisdiction of both federal and state courts does not alone
mean that an Article III problem exists. For example, although the
Supreme Court clearly exercises the federal judicial power while hearing an appeal of a state court case, the state court that originally heard
the case did not improperly exercise the federal judicial power, nor
will state courts that will hear the case on remand from the Supreme
Court.

21

I)

But, from an Article III perspective, certification is not similar to
an appeal of a state court case to the United States Supreme Court. In
the standard appellate setting, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is derivative of the state court's jurisdiction. On remand, the state court's
jurisdiction is, even if in some limited sense, derivative of the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction which resulted from the state court system's ear21
lier jurisdiction. '
209

See supra Part II.C.
See supra text accompanying note 126 (discussing the application of the unitary
conception to appeals of state court cases to the United States Supreme Court). Indeed,
there are situations in which the case that the Supreme Court ultimately reviews could not
have been heard in federal court as an initial matter. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction
to review such state court decisions because the state court judgment on the matter converts the case into one that meets the Article Ill requirements. SeeASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish,
490 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1989). In this sense, the Court's jurisdiction is very much derivative
of the slate court's jurisdiction. See supra note 126. Also, Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Eleventh Amendment does not circumscribe Supreme Court appellate review of a state court judgment even if it would, if asserted, preclude initial federal court
treatment of the underlying case. See McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages &
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 28 & n.9 (1990); see also Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine
of PersonalJurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1559, 1653-54 (2002) (arguing that the seeming
inconsistency in Supreme Court precedent on this point results from the Supreme Court's
"[failure] to recognize the difference between the 'personal jurisdiction' type of immunity
that Madison and Marshall discussed . . . and the 'subject matter jurisdiction' type of immunity that the Eleventh Amendment later created," meaning that the Eleventh Amendment only entitles states to assert an absence of federal court personal jurisdiction over
them, but does not affect the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction over cases).
211
This is true even if the Supreme Court remands the case to the state court for the
limited purpose of having the state court clarify its prior holding. See supra note 127 and
accompanying text.
210
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Under a unitary conception of certification, by contrast, the state
court's jurisdiction is entirely derivative of the federal court's jurisdiction. It is clearly the federal court and not the parties that instigates
certification proceedings under the unitary conception. 21 2 Moreover,
the federal court instigates the action as to a case that is properly
within the federal judicial power; the case presumably falls within the
court's constitutional and statutory jurisdiction and is pending in federal court. The state court, then, exercises jurisdiction by virtue of the
federal judicial power, and it exercises jurisdiction as to a case properly within the federal judicial power. It cannot be argued that the
federal judicial power is properly interpreted as restricted to some
proper subset of the case, as it can for an appeal of a state court case
to the Supreme Court. Under these circumstances, the state court
can be seen as improperly exercising the federal judicial power. 21 3
Thus, although the unitary conception of certification raises
problems under Article III, the binary conception does not. Which
conception is more valid? The best answer available is that current
certification procedures are consistent with the binary conception
that the federal court abstains while the state high court, under its
own jurisdiction and of its own volition, conducts and resolves a truncated and limited independent state case. It is also consistent, however, with the unitary conception that the state court merely assumes
control, for a time, over a federal case. Given the dominant view that
certification procedures contribute positively to both the federal and
state judicial systems, a federal court faced with the question likely
would avoid the significant constitutional issues presented by the latter paradigm and rely instead on a binary conception of certification
in order to justify the procedure. 21 4
212
Under the binary conception, the federal court's only decision is to abstain; it is the
parties who commence the separate certification action in state court. See supra note 173
and accompanying text.
213 But cf Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative
Courts Under Article III, 65 INn. L.J. 233, 267 (1990) (arguing that Article II "does not give
specific content to the concept that the federal judicial power must be exercised by the
courts specified therein"). Bator, however, was concerned with the propriety of federal
legislative and administrative tribunals hearing matters falling under the Article Ill categories in the first instance. He thus proceeded to emphasize his conclusion that Article III
"in particular does not specify that the exercise of federal judicial power must involve the
initiation of the case in an article IIlcourt." Id. The setting of certification is more complex in two ways. First, unlike a federal legislative or administrative tribunal, a state court is
not under the control of the certifying federal court in any sense. See infta text accompanying notes 217-19. Second, unlike federal court review of legislative and administrative
tribunals, certification involves state court jurisdiction sandwiched between exercises of
federal court jurisdiction.
214 A basic tenet of statutory construction is that a statute should be construed so as to
avoid either an unconstitutional interpretation or an interpretation that raises constitutional questions and doubts. See United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916)
("A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that
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A final question is whether the Article III problem that would
arise under the unitary conception of certification can be waived by
litigants. If it can be waived, then the suggestion that the availability
of certification should be constrained to cases in which "both parties
agree to its use ' 215 might be sufficient to insulate certification against
constitutional attack under the unitary conception. Ultimately, however, the Article III problem is not waivable. Although the Supreme
Court has recognized that litigants may waive their right to have certain matters proceed before Article III judges in favor of magistrate
judges, 2 16 it has rested its reasoning on the notion that magistrate
judges operate under the "'total control and jurisdiction"' of the district court.217 This retention of ultimate control by the district court

removes any possible "'threat to the judicial power or the independence of judicial decisionmaking that underlies Art[icle] III."'218 In
contrast, state courts are in no sense under the control of any federal
court with respect to issues of state law-the subject matter of certified
questions. As such, it seems clear that litigants' consent to certification is not sufficient to overcome the Article III difficulties raised by
19
the unitary conception.2
it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score."); 2A NORMANJ. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUroRY CONSrRuCrION § 45.11, at 48-49 (5th ed, 1992) ("[A] court should
construe legislative enactments to avoid constitutional difficulties if possible."); see also
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988) (" [S] tatutes will be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties."). Courts likely would apply this doctrine in construing state certification statutes and procedural rules. To the extent that the court understands that its role is
not to determine the proper construction of a certification statute or rule, but rather to
construe properly certification procedure, the rule of statutory interpretation should apply
by analogy to such construction.
215 Rehnquist, supra note 99, at 1113 n.366. In addition, Rehnquist would limit certification to cases in which both "the state court has a track record of promptly answering
such questions" and "certification will not delay the litigation any more than would resolution of the issue by the federal court." Id. Finally, he would mandate that "[diecisions not
to certify . . .be nonreviewable." Id.
216
See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991)

(holding that a criminal defendant

may waive his right to have voir dire for his felony trial presided over by an Article III
judge, by consenting to having a magistrate preside over the proceeding).
217 Id. at 937 (quoting United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 (1980)).
218 Id. at 938 (quoting Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 686 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
219 The ability of a litigant's approval of certification to overcome Article III concerns
is also precarious because the Supreme Court has yet to approve the broad proposition
that non Article Ill tribunals can decide legal questions in matters that fall within Article
II. Cf Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986) (upholding agency's ability to preside over brokerage customer's common-law counterclaims
where customer approved of agency's role, but noting specifically that the agency's legal
determinations were subject to de novo review by the federal courts). However, the federal
courts of' appeals have unanimously upheld the ability of magistrate judges to hear civil
matters filed in federal court when the parties so consent. See, e.g.,
Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984); Mag. Judges Div. of the Admin. Office of
the U.S. Courts, supra note 144, at 252 n.3.
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Thus, such Article III concerns are structural. As a result, in order to uphold certification in the face of constitutional challenge,
courts must embrace the binary conception of the procedure.
B.

Is Certification Inconsistent with the Grant of Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction?

In subpart A, this Article considered questions raised by certification which are addressed by reference to a binary conception of certification. This subpart considers a second question raised by
certification: whether federal court use of certification is inconsistent
with the federal diversity grant. The resolution of this question could
have a large impact on the use and value of certification, as "most
certified questions are asked by federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction." 220 This subpart demonstrates that, given the current shape
of certification jurisprudence and the precedential standard set by
Meredith, the unitary conception of certification offers the best answer
to the federal diversity grant consistency question. It also considers
the possibility of harmonizing the diversity statute with the use of certification under a binary conception. Such an approach is possible,
but it requires limiting, if not repealing or overruling, Meredith. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of the federal
diversity jurisdiction-to provide out-of-state residents with a neutral
forum.
The Constitution authorizes federal courts to hear "Controversies
...between Citizens of different States." 22 1 The Supreme Court has
explained that "[d] iversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in
order to prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against
those not citizens of the State." 22 2 In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton justifies the decision to allow federal courts to hear diversity cases
on the ground that "the [s]tate tribunals cannot be supposed to be
impartial and unbiased" in such cases. 223
220
Selya, supra note 20, at 688 (citing GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 105, at 41); accord
SERON, supra note 110, at 7 (reporting results of a study which found that nearly two-thirds
of all cases in which certification was employed were diversity cases); cf GOLDSCIIMIDT,
supra note 105, at 64 ("Most circuit judges (96%), district judges (83%), and state justices
(87%) disagreewith the proposition that certification from a federal court 'should only be
allowed when a federal constitutional issue would be avoided by a state's response."'). In
this regard, consider also proposals to expand the use of certification. See infra notes
266-68 and accompanying text.
221
U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
222
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
223
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.
1961). Hamilton also indicated that the diversity grant was appropriate to ensure the
"peace of the Union." Id. at 501.
As is often the case with the origins of constitutional provisions, "the original purposes
of diversity jurisdiction remain subject to dispute." Schapiro, supra note 77, at 1442; see,
e.g., William A. Braverman, Note, Janus Was Not a God ofJustice: Realignment of Parties in
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Despite the broad constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction,
the federal courts are empowered to exercise jurisdiction in diversity
cases only to the extent that Congress opts to confer all, or some part,
of the Constitutional diversity grant to the courts. 224 In fact, Congress
has chosen to confer some, but not all, of the diversity jurisdictional
power authorized by the Constitution. For example, Congress's diversity statute requires complete diversity among plaintiffs and defend2 26
ants, 2 25 while the Constitution requires only minimal diversity.
Also, the diversity statute includes a minimum amount-in-controversy
requirement, set today at $75,000; that is not required by the
2 27
Constitution.
The congressionally created diversity jurisdiction is not discretionary, in that the federal courts may not decline to hear diversity
cases that are properly brought within their jurisdiction. Indeed, this
fact underlay the Court's holding in Meredith, which stated that allowing a federal court to apply Pullman abstention in a pure diversity
case, which implicates no substantial state interest, would be inconsistent with the federal diversity statute. 228 Nonetheless, as explained
above, the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have conDiversityJurisdiction,68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1072, 1078 (1993) (identifying four rationales underlying the Founders' inclusion of diversity jurisdiction in the Constitution: "diversity would
increase harmony between the states; it would protect out-of-state citizens from state court
bias, or the fear of local court bias; it would provide citizens of different states access to
superior federal courts; and it would encourage interstate commerce and investment"). See
generally Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of DiversityJurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REV. 483
(1928). In any event, there can be no doubt that "one prominent rationale was, and is, the
need to protect outsiders against bias from local state judges." Schapiro, supra note 77, at
1442.
A robust debate has raged among lawyers, legal academics, and legislators as to
whether Congress should expand, contract, or eliminate federal diversity jurisdiction. See,
e.g.,
Ian Anderson et al., Report of the New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on the
Federal Courts on the Recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee to Abolish Diversity
Jurisdiction, 158 F.R.D. 185 (1995); Ann Woolhandler & Michael C. Collins,JudicialFederalism and the Administrative States, 87 CAL. L. REV. 613, 655 n.168 (1999); Braverman, supra, at
1077 n.20. At bottom, however, "[e]ven though some critics have expressed doubts about
the continued need for certain categories of federal jurisdiction-particularly diversity jurisdiction-they remain a given whose provision and presumed purposes the judicial
branch is obliged to honor." Woolhandler & Collins, supra, at 655 (footnote omitted).
224
Cf Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
FederalJurisdiction,65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 218-19 (1985) (noting that Article III directs that
the federal judicial power "shall extend to 'all cases' in the first three categories (defined
by subject matter)," but arguing that it "need not ... extend to 'all' cases in the last six
(defined by party)" (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 334-36
(1816).
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
225
226
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967).
227
See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205, 110 Stat.
3847, 3850 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994) by changing the required minimum
amount in controversy to $75,000).
228
See supra text accompanying note 30 (quoting from the Court's opinion in
Meredith).

20031

FEDERAL COURT POWER TO CERTIFY

1731

cluded that they can properly invoke certification in pure diversity
cases. This raises the question of how invocation of certification can
be consistent with the federal diversity grant.
As an initial matter, it is clear that invocation of certification in a
diversity case is consistent with the constitutional diversity grant. 2 29

Because Congress is free to confer as much or as little of the constitutional grant as it chooses, it could constitutionally include an authorization for federal courts to utilize, in their discretion, state court
certification procedures. Doing so would merely carve out a piece of
the statutory diversity grant. At the same time, it is clear that Congress, consistent with the Constitution, could choose not to carve out
an exception for certification in diversity cases. Congress chose the
latter option.
There are various possible reasons for rejection of such a carve
out by Congress. For example, Congress reasonably could conclude,
in keeping with Hamilton's analysis, 230 that the tribunals of the
states-including the states' high courts-might discriminate against
out-of-state residents. 23' Further, although one might suggest that the
limited role of the state high court in deciding questions of law greatly
limits its ability to discriminate against a particular party, state high
courts considering certified questions do not decide these questions
of law in a vacuum. Rather, they decide questions of law against the
backdrop of a well-developed factual record. 2 32 Surely it would not be

inconceivable for a state high court to decide a certified legal question
one way based upon animus towards a particular party, and then in a
later case to limit the legal rule to the factual setting in which the
question was presented.
The statutory diversity grant enacted by Congress includes no explicit carve out for the use of certification. 23 3 How, then, can the use
of certification by federal courts be harmonized with the statutory diversity grant? There are two possible justifications. First, one can argue that Congress has implicitly approved of certification, and
incorporated it into the diversity jurisdiction statute, by modifying the
statute during the period in which federal courts have made great use
of certification procedure without expressly disallowing such action
229
See Gowen & Iziar, supra note 33, at 207 ("[T]he Meredith right is not a constitutional right but merely a statutory right .... " (footnote omitted)).
230 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
231
See infra text accompanying notes 271-308.
232
Indeed, absent a well developed factual record, a state high court is unlikely to
accept certified questions in the first place. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
233
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). Some federal courts have adopted local rules that
authorize those courts to utilize certification procedure. See, e.g., 7TH CIR. R. 52. Such
rules, however, are adopted under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 47, pursuant
to which courts are authorized to "make and amend rules governing its practice," provided
that such rules are "consistent with ... Acts of Congress." FED. R. APP. P. 47(a)(1).
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(the "legislative ratification argument") .234 Second, one can argue
that federal courts generally have discretion (albeit limited and directed) to decline to exercise jurisdiction over cases that otherwise fall
within their constitutional and statutory subject matter jurisdiction,
and that it is within the federal courts' discretionary power to employ
certification procedure in diversity cases is on that same basis (the
"implicit discretion argument") .235
However, neither of these arguments, standing alone, is sufficient
to overcome the apparent inconsistency of employing certification in
diversity cases against the backdrop of Meredith, in that neither argument attempts to distinguish certification from Pullman abstention.
Without such a distinction, the notion that Congress has legislatively
ratified the option to incorporate certification procedure into the diversity statute is difficult to square with the Court's reaffirmations of
Meredith.236 Similarly, even if one accepts David Shapiro's general proposition, the Court in Meredith seemed to reject squarely the notion
that federal courts have discretion, under the guise of Pullman abstention, to decline to decide state law issues in diversity cases in favor of a
2 37
state court proceeding.
234 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975) ("The
longstanding acceptance by the courts, coupled with Congress's failure to reject [a lower
court's previous] reasonable interpretation of the wording of § 10(b) .... argues significantly in favor of acceptance of the [lower court's] rule by this Court." (footnote omitted)); see also United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 495 (1997) ("[W]e presume that
Congress expects its statutes to be read in conformity with this Court's precedents ......
(citation omitted)). Courts have applied this reasoning in the context of interpreting federal jurisdictional statutes. See, e.g., Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1064 (5th Cir.
1990) ("The distinctive language contained in the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act removal jurisdiction provision] should be interpreted against a background of congressional
understanding of the possibilities inherent in the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Congress enacted the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] well after the Supreme Court's [approval of] pendent claim jurisdiction.").
235 See supra note 205 and accompanying text. But cf Henderson, supra note 110, at
640 (courts should not "unilaterally act to contract or otherwise control their jurisdiction
when the Constitution expressly delegates that task to Congress").
236 See supra text accompanying notes 44-49; Clark, supra note 16, at 1531-33 (rejecting the notion that the 1948 recodification of the diversity statute resulted in the legislative ratification of Erie based abstention).
Brian Mattis laments that "[t]he availability of a certification procedure has resulted in
the federal courts forgetting the teaching of Meredith v.City of Winter Haven, and using the
procedure merely to resolve difficult questions of state law." Mattis, supra note 81, at
729-30 (footnote omitted). He proceeds to cite favorably the American Law Institute's
then recently proposed codification of abstention that would allow federal courts to abstain only if one of two circumstances were met: where such a course might avoid the
necessity of deciding a substantial question of federal constitutional law, or where failure to
abstain might lead to a serious danger of embarrassing the effectuation of state policies.
See id. at 731. He concludes by arguing that this requirement be extended to certification:
"It is suggested that, if certification is to be permitted at all, one of these two circumstances
must be found to exist." Id.
237
Cf Clark, supra note 16, at 1530-31 (discussing the limitations of Shapiro's reasoning as a justification for Erie based abstention).
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. Both the unitary and binary conceptions of certification offer the
possibility of harmonizing certification with the diversity statute. A
unitary conception permits preservation of Meredith, but, as described
above, is constitutionally problematic. 23 3 Alternatively, a binary conception requires a limited reading of Meredith, if not its outright repeal. 23 9 Moreover, the binary conception is irreconcilable with the

fundamental premise underlying diversity jurisdiction.
1. Attempting to Harmonize Meredith and Certification Under a
Unitary Conception
A unitary conception of certification buttresses both the legislative ratification argument and the implicit discretion argument. The
conception fundamentally distinguishes certification from the paradigmatic binary doctrine of Pullman abstention. Further, the apparent problem of invoking certification in pure diversity cases is reduced
under a unitary conception of certification, in that it allows one to
conceive of a single case with jurisdiction moving from federal to state
court, then back again. That, in turn, allows one to conclude that a
federal court invoking certification does not shirk its duty (as the
240
Court in Meredith asserted) to decide cases within its jurisdiction.
Indeed, the state law questions are resolved in the very case that is
before the federal court. Even though it is a state court that resolves
the state law questions, the state court jurisdiction is derivative of the
federal court's jurisdiction.
The unitary conception of certification thus takes steps to preserve the reasoning of Meredith, as well as its holding. Still, for many
for the reasons discussed below in the context of the binary conception, some inconsistencies remain; 24 1 resort to the unitary conception
is not wholly satisfying. Moreover, as described above, the unitary conSee supra Part III.A.
Harmonizing certification and the diversity statute through the limitation or repeal
of Meredith will work under a unitary conception, as well as under a binary conception.
However, as explained earlier, the Constitution demands that certification be understood
under the binary conception, see supra Part III.A, and the two conceptions cannot both
apply in respect of any one procedural device, see supra Part II.D. Thus, given the option
between the two conceptions, the binary conception is preferable.
240
Along these lines, one early student commentator suggested:
Another question to be answered is whether the objection to the abstention
doctrine relating to the unauthorized relinquishment of federal jurisdiction is a valid one. It seems that, in those cases which are dismissed by the
federal courts, there is an unauthorized relinquishment of federal jurisdiction. When a case is stayed, the federal forum retains jurisdiction, and there
is only postponement of decision. The use of abstention in the "stay" situation does not defeat diversity jurisdiction. In dealing with [certification],
the federal forum parts with no jurisdiction.
Kaplan, supra note 84, at 431-32 (footnote omitted).
241
See infra Part III.B.2.b.
238

239
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ception leaves certification susceptible to constitutional challenge.
Accordingly, the next issue is the possible harmonization of Meredith
with certification under the binary conception.
2.

Attempting to Harmonize Meredith and Certification Under a
Binary Conception

Pullman abstention is the paradigm of a binary conception of jurisdiction in an interjurisdictional setting. As such, the notion of harmonizing the Court's holding in Meredith with the use of certification
in pure diversity cases, using a binary conception, appears difficult if
not impossible. Thus, despite some commentators' characterization
of certification as a form of abstention, 24 2 Paul LeBel explains: "So
long as the Supreme Court's decision in [Meredith] .. .is read as pre-

cluding abstention for the sole purpose of avoiding the decision of a
difficult question of state law,

. . .

federal courts certifying questions of

state law need to find a label other than abstention for what they are
24 3
doing."
242 See AM. LAW INST., supra note 89, at 293 (observing that under ALI's proposed codification of certification, "the federal court retains jurisdiction and can vacate its stay if at
any time it appears that the state's certification is not proving to be effective in reaching a
prompt and final disposition of the certified question"); CIEMERINSKY, Suflna note 117,
§ 12.3, at 765 (referring to certification as a subset of Pullman abstention); FALLON ET AL.,
supra note 43, at 1256 (asserting that "both courts and commentators have frequently
treated federal courts' decisions to certify questions to state courts as decisions to abstain");
LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 142 (1994) ("[S]tate certification
schemes should be regarded as fitting occasions for abstention ....");Mattis, supra note
81, at 723 ("Since the federal court retains jurisdiction over the entire case, it may vacate its
stay and decide all of the issues, state and federal, if it appears that the state court is not
acting with proper dispatch." (footnote omitted)).
243
LeBel, supra note 19, at 1002 n.13. Cf CHEMERNSKY, supra note 117, § 12.3, at 765
("There is a strong argument that the existence of certification should not increase the
frequency of abstention. Certification modifies the procedure by which a case is returned
to state court, but certification does not provide an additional reason for abstention.").
Richard Lillich and Raymond Mundy acknowledge that "some commentators ... have
concluded that 'the availability of a certification procedure may tempt a federal court to
abstain by certification where there is no justification for abstention except that the state
question is difficult."' Lillich & Mundy, supra note 109, at 899 (quoting CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 204 (2d ed. 1970)). They respond that "[c]riticism of
this nature, of course, goes more to the abstention doctrine itself than to the certification
process," id., and that "[c]riticizing certification on this ground is like condemning drink
because some persons occasionally use it immoderately," id. at 899 n.80. However, neither
of their criticisms is valid. First, the criticism is directed not at the abstention doctrine (the
availability of which is subject to the holding in Meredith) but to the notion of exempting
certification from Meredith's reach. Second, contrary to Lillich and Mundy's proffered
analogy, the criticism does not compare to "condemning drink because some persons occasionally use it immoderately." After all, the criticism does not suggest that certification
should be eliminated altogether, but only that its use should be restricted in pure diversity
cases where the only justification for its use is that an undecided question of state law
exists. A far better analogy, and one that reveals certification's potential inconsistency with
Meredith, is to condemning a legal regime that makes no distinction between those who
drink immoderately and those who drink responsibly.
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An obvious way to overcome this objection is for Congress to repeal Meredith by enacting a statute that explicitly authorizes federal
courts to employ a certification procedure in pure diversity cases that
turn on undecided questions of state law. 244 This would offer the benefit of codifying, and thus clearly sanctioning, the use of certification
in diversity cases. However, what may seem in theory to be the simple
task of codifying the use of a discretionary device such as certification
may prove in practice to be far more difficult because it may lead to
numerous and unintended changes to existing law. 245 For this reason
and others, it may be unrealistic to expect the Congress to pass, and
2 46
the President to sign, such a bill.

Perhaps a cleaner, and more reliable, way to remove Meredith's
specter would be for the Court itself explicitly to overrule Meredith.
The Court, however, has shown no such inclination. Over the years,
24 7
the Court has reaffirmed Meredith's continuing vitality.

The objection raised by LeBel and other commentators also may
be overcome by merely pruning Meredith. In particular, one can read
Meredith to hold that Pullman abstention is inappropriate in pure diLarry Roth asserts that "[t]he Florida certification statute was designed to be consistent with the theory behind the abstention doctrine and yet not do violence to the Meredith
principle." Roth, supra note 92, at 7. However, Roth provides no authority for this proposition. Indeed, to the contrary, he notes that "[t] here are no known recorded reports or
hearings with regard to the legislative history" of the Florida certification statute. Id. at 6
n.28. Thus, Clark comments only that it is "perhapsno coincidence" that Florida adopted
its certification statute less than two years after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Meredith, Clark, supra note 16, at 1545 (emphasis added), and acknowledges that
"[wihether the Florida legislature adopted the certification procedure in direct response
to Meredith is difficult to determine given" the absence of legislative history, id. at 1545
n.451. See also Selya, supra note 20, at 680 (surmising that the Florida legislature that enacted the certification statute was "no doubt licking its wounds over some real or imagined
intrusion by a federal court into the exclusive domain of state suzerainty").
244 There have in the past been proposals to codify certification procedure in federal
law. SeeYACKLE, supra note 242, at 143-44 (suggesting language for a certification statutory
provision); AM. LAw INST., supra note 89, § 1371 (e), at 50 (same). A proposal by the ALl
includes an express codification of the rule of Meredith in general abstention cases but not
in certification cases, and thus, by omission, would limit Meredith to full-fledged cases of
abstention. Compare id. § 1371(c), at 49, with id. § 1371(e), at 50; Mattis, supra note 81, at
731 (suggesting an amendment to the ALl proposal, which would apply Meredith's rule to
certification as well). "A bill offered by Charles Mathias and Edward Brooke in 1977 included the ALI's proposal regarding certification almost verbatim." YACKLE, supra note
242, at 142 (citing S. 35, 95th Cong. (1978) (footnote omitted)).
245
Consider, for example, the substantial time and effort devoted to "fix" the codification of supplemental jurisdiction authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000). See, e.g., Am.
LAw INST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT: PROPOSED REVISION OF 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367 (1997); Symposium, A Reappraisal of the Supplemental-Jurisdiction Statute: Title 28
U.S.C. § 1367, 74 IND. L.J. 1 (1998).
246

Consider the fate of the AIl's proposal (discussed supra notes 236, 244).

Erwin

Chemerinsky notes, "Although the ALI's recommendations were made ... in 1969, Congress has shown no indication that they are likely to be adopted." CHEMERINSKv, supra note
117, § 12.3, at 767.
247
See supra text accompanying notes 44-49.
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versity cases, and not to hold that there is a blanket rule against abstention in pure diversity cases. This conclusion rests on the costs and
delays inherent in full fledged Pullman abstention. Under this reading, certification-as a streamlined abstention procedure-may pass
muster under Meredith.
Meredith held that a federal court cannot invoke Pullman abstention simply because it was faced with difficult, undecided questions of
state law. 248 Later courts have emphasized that one of the factors a

court should consider in deciding whether or not to engage in abstention in general, and in Pullman abstention in particular, is the cost and
delay inherent in the procedure. 249 Of course, insofar as Pullman abstention requires a full round of litigation in the state courts, on top
of proceedings in the federal court before which the original case is
pending, that procedure necessarily imposes relatively large costs and
delays on the litigants and on the courts. 2 5° Thus, it is possible to
interpret Meredith to mean that, in the absence of a compelling interest to engage in Pullman abstention (in a pure diversity case, for example), the cost and delay that would inhere in such a procedure
precludes that course as a matter of law. In contrast, under Pullman
(as Meredith acknowledges), the presence of a federal constitutional
question, the resolution of which might be rendered unnecessary by a
definitive resolution of a state law question, is enough to overcome
Meredith's presumption against Pullman abstention .25
Pullman abstention hardly covers the landscape of federal court
abstention doctrines. It applies only to situations where (i) a federal
court abstains from proceeding in a case before it, in order that (ii)
the parties can engage in a full round of state court litigation as to
certain issues of state law, in the hope that (iii) (as Meredith mandated) the resolution of the issues of state law obviates the need for
the federal court to confront a serious federal constitutional issue.
There is no reason, then, that Meredith's per se rule need apply to
other forms of abstention. Indeed, the Court has approved of Erie
based abstention in rare diversity cases. 25 2 As the Court explained in
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 253 Meredith did not
See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236-37 (1943).
See, e.g., Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 697 (5th Cir. 1981) (resolving whether
using Pullman abstention requires a court to "assess the totality of circumstances[,] . . .
which should include consideration of the rights at stake and the costs of delay pending
state court adjudication").
250
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
251
See Meredith, 320 U.S. at 236 ("[A] federal court... may stay proceedings before it,
to enable the parties to litigate first in the state courts questions of state law, decision of
which is preliminary to, and may render unnecessary, decision of the constitutional questions presented.").
252
See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
253'
360 U.S. 25 (1959).
248
249
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hold that federal courts are 'jurisdictionally disabled from seeking the
controlling light" of a state supreme court. 254 This and other cases
suggest that Meredith's rule is not absolute.
As explained above, it is entirely possible to view a federal court
that has decided to certify questions of law to a state high court as
abstaining from jurisdiction until the state court answers those questions (or otherwise responds to the certification request). In other
words, it is possible to conceive of certification under a binary conception.2

55

In effect, the only major procedural difference between Pull-

man abstention and certification abstention is that the former
envisions a full round of litigation in the state courts (prong (ii) in the
definition of Pullman abstention proffered just above) while the latter
allows use of a specialized, expedited procedure for state court resolution of the certified questions.
From the standpoint of the restricted interpretation of Meredith
that is now suggested, the availability of this streamlined state review
in certification allows relaxation of the threshold requirement for invocation of the procedure (prong (iii) in the definition of Pullman
abstention), which Meredith itself imposed as a prerequisite to the application of Pullman abstention. 2 56 Thus, while Meredith precludes
conceiving of certification as a form of Pullman abstention 25 7 (a conclusion that, incidentally, is already precluded by the differences between the two procedures that have evolved over the years258 ), this

interpretation of Meredith allows one to conceive of certification as a
form of abstention generally, or to rely on a binary conception of certification. It makes reliance on a binary conception possible by strictly
2 59
limiting Meredith's scope to consideration of Pullman abstention.
But the binary conception of certification is not a panacea. First,
the binary conception limits the scope of certification procedure. In
particular, it does not allow the certification doctrine to stretch to the
limits that some commentators have supposed. 260 Second, even if the
binary conception allows certification to be harmonized with a narrow
254

Id. at 27 n.2.
See supra Part II.C.
See Meredith, 320 U.S. at 236.
See supra note 243.
See supra Parts I.B.2, I.C.l.a.
259
In addition, the binary conception of certification is attractive in that it squares
nicely with the heuristic device which understands certification as akin to having a panel of
state judges attend hearings of federal cases and issue determinations of state law issues as
they arise. Cf Roth, supra note 92, at 11 (suggesting that states form specialized tribunals
to handle certified questions from federal courts); Judith Resnik, History,Jurisdiction, and
the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L.
REv. 171, 205 (1995) ("Federal and state judges in charge of 'All Brooklyn Navy Yard'
asbestos cases literally sat in the same room, jointly convening a 'state and federal court'
and ruling together on issues." (footnote omitted)); supra note 18.
260
See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
255
256
257
258
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reading of Meredith, the fact remains that a binary conception of certification remains inconsistent with Meredith's central theme and the
fundamental purpose of the federal diversity jurisdiction: securing a
2
neutral judicial forum for out-of-state residents. 11'
a. Ramifications of the Binary Conception for Certification
Jurisprudence
Uniform application of the binary conception of certification
would have ramifications for certification jurisprudence. In order to
limit Meredith such that it allowed certification in pure diversity cases
consistent with a binary conception, the courts would have to abandon the reasoning-suggested by language of the Supreme Court in
Lehman Bros. v. Schein,2 62 and also by federal court opinions that adhere to state court responses to certified questions based upon the law
of the case doctrine 2 63-that Pullman abstention, but not certification,
involves the commencement of a new litigation in state court. The
explanation that the use of certification does not frustrate the duty of
the federal courts to hear diversity cases, which the Supreme Court
recognized in Meredith, would replace this reasoning. Also, reliance
upon the binary conception would clarify that, while the decision to
abstain pending certification rests with the federal court, the decision
to pursue certification in the state court rests with the parties.
Reliance upon the binary conception, to the extent it is viable,
means that state high courts which answer certified questions are in
fact administering their own cases while the certifying federal court
abstains from proceeding forward with independent federal cases. As
a result, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, state high courts answering
certified questions in theory should be free to engage in factfinding.
They also should be free to add or dismiss parties in the case before
them. 264 Of course, state courts voluntarily may agree (or the drafters
of state law may choose to direct them) not to engage in these acts in
order to induce federal courts to make use of the certification abstention process. In any event, were a state high court to engage in such
acts, the certifying federal court should be free to ignore them for
purposes of the federal case to the extent that they exceed the scope
2 5
of the federal court's certification. 6
See Meredith, 320 U.S. at 234-36.
416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974); see supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
263
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
264
Under a unitary conception, a state court presumably would not be free to act this
way. A state court's answer to a federal court might result in the dismissal of one or more
parties, but the federal court effects this result-the state court merely renders answers to
legal questions.
265
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
261

262
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Application of the binary conception of certification also poses
an obstacle for commentators who advocate expanding the scope of
certification. For example, Bradford Clark proposes to broaden certification by creating a "presumption in favor of certification whenever
the procedure is available and [federal courts] are presented with unsettled questions of state law that call for the exercise of significant
policymaking discretion more appropriately left to the states."2 66 The
class of cases in which questions require "significant policymaking discretion" that might be "more appropriately left to the states" is not
small. Thus, a presumption in favor of certification abstention in that
class of cases would expand the use of abstention doctrine beyond its
current scope. For many of these cases, one would expect this expansion to run afoul of Meredith, given the degree to which one must restrict that case's holding just to square it with the binary conception of
26 7
certification in its current form.

The binary conception is even more problematic for Judge Jon
Newman's proposal to expand certification "by permitting the entire
appeal of a diversity case to be routed into the state appellate court
system, where it would normally be adjudicated, as it should be, by an
intermediate state appellate court, with only optional review by the
state's highest court." 268 In addition to the previously identified
problems with expanding the class of cases in which certification
might be available, Judge Newman's proposal would undo the tenuous harmonization of Meredith with certification (achievable under
current law) by introducing lower state courts, which may be more
266 Clark, supra note 16, at 1544-45; see also id. at 1549-56. Clark's suggestion is reminiscent of Larry Roth's proposal that the Fifth Circuit adopt a "policy... to certify any state
law issue where there is no 'clear controlling' precedent." Roth, supra note 92, at 10. Cf
YACKLE, supra note 242, at 143 (proposing a federal statute that would authorize certification if "(1) the state has a [certification procedure]; (2) the question of state law can
resolve the dispute between the parties and cannot satisfactorily be determined in light of
existing state authorities; and (3) the [federal] court expressly finds that certification will
not cause undue delay or prejudice to the parties").
267 The binary conception is similarly problematic forJudge Guido Calabresi's suggestion that "[t]he teaching of Arizonans ... is that we should consider certifying in more
instances than had previously been thought appropriate, and do so even when the federal
courts might think that the meaning of a state law is 'plain."' Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67,
73 (2d Cir. 2000) (per CalabresiJ.; Sack, J., concurred and Van Graafeiland,J., dissented)
(citing Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997)). Cf Ellen A.
Peters, State-FederalJudicial Relationships: A Report from the Trenches, 78 VA. L. REV. 1887,
1892-93 (1992) (noting, in summarizing the conclusions of the National Conference on
State-Federal judicial Relationships, that "[t] he federal certification of issues of state law to
state courts would be enhanced by agreement about procedures for the appropriate definition of novel questions of law by the federal courts and for their speedy resolution by the
state courts").
268
Newman, supra note 110, at 774-75. Judge Newman also advocates making state
law cases adjudicated in federal trial court eligible for state court appeal, and federal law
cases adjudicated in state trial court eligible for federal court appeal. See id. at 774.

1740

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:1672

likely to engage in bias against out-of-state residents, into the certification process.
b.

Inconsistency Between the Binary Conception of Certification
and the FundamentalPurpose of the Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction

While resort to the binary conception of certification allows for
greater consistency between certification and Meredith's holding, it
clashes with Meredith's central theme: federal courts generally have a
duty to hear cases that fall within the diversity jurisdiction as created
by the Constitution and conferred by Congress. 269 The reason for the
persistence of the clash with Meredith's reasoning is simple: Meredith at
its core highlights the importance of having federal courts hear cases
that fall properly within the diversity jurisdiction. The binary conception of certification is inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of
the diversity jurisdiction, which is to afford out-of-state residents the
opportunity to have cases heard in a neutral forum.
Applying the binary conception to certification allows one to distinguish Pullman abstention from, and hence limit Meredith's applicability to, certification, solely on the grounds that (i) certification
entails far less cost and delay than does Pullman abstention and (ii)
the certification setting is less conducive to bias against out-of-state
litigants than the Pullman abstention setting. The first ground-that
certification reduces cost and delay-relates only tangentially to Meredith's reasoning: The Court in Meredith made only one oblique reference to delay.2 711Cost and delay were not central to the reasoning of
the Court in Meredith.
The second ground on which the binary conception allows one to
distinguish between certification and Pullman abstention-that the
certification setting is less likely to give rise to bias-speaks more to
Meredith's rationale. Three arguments suggest that the certification
setting protects against the bias that diversity jurisdiction is supposed
to protect. First, bias may result substantially from juries in state
courts; in the certification setting, there are no juries. Second, lower
level state court judges may be more likely to engage in and exhibit
bias than their counterparts on higher state courts; certification procedure only enlists judges of the state's highest court. Third, bias is
more likely to result where a state court engages in factfinding and
less likely to occur when courts are called upon to resolve broad legal
questions; certification only calls upon state courts to announce legal
See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943).
The Court explained: "To remit the parties to the state courts is to delay further
the disposition of the litigation which has been pending for more than two years and which
is now ready for decision." Id. at 237.
269
270
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rules and, as such, is unlikely to give the state courts freedom to entertain bias against out-of-state litigants. However, none of these arguments sufficiently establishes that the process of having state high
courts respond to certified questions will eliminate bias against out-ofstate litigants. Further, even if these arguments have some substantive
and empirical accuracy, out-of-state litigants reasonably might continue to fear bias against them. It is not only actual bias, but also
perception and fear of bias, that motivates diversity jurisdiction. 271
First, while juries may introduce a particular source of bias
against out-of-state residents, the absence of ajury does not eliminate
all potential for bias. Indeed, Hamilton's justification for federal diversity jurisdiction rests on the notion that state tribunals, not juries,
cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased. 2 72 Moreover, to
explain the greater presence of bias against out-of-state litigants in
state courts as opposed to federal courts, despite the fact that federal
and state trial courts both empanel juries from residents of a single
state, some commentators identify the real problem in state trial
courts as the failure (or lesser ability) of state judges properly to control and confine the discretion of state court juries. 273 Once again,
then, the focus reverts to the tendency of state court judges to tolerate, if not encourage, bias against out-of-state litigants.
Second, the fact that only judges of a state's highest court deal
27 4
with certified questions does not remove the potential for bias.

271
272
273

See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
For example, a New York County Lawyers Association subcommittee on diversity
jurisdiction wrote:
[T]here are significant ways for a federal judge to protect out-of-state litigants against local bias in jury trials. First, a federal judge may be able to
guard against a biased jury more effectively than a state court [judge]. For
example, a federal judge may comment on testimony, while some state
judges cannot. Moreover, federal judges may conduct the voir dire of potential juries, rather than leaving that task to the lawyers. Finally, a federal
judge may affect the jury's verdict by fashioning equitable remedies.
Anderson et al., supra note 223, at 202 (footnote omitted)); Neal Miller, An EmpiricalStudy
of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity andFederal QuestionJurisdiction,41 AM. U. L.
REV. 369, 415-16, 429 (1992) (presenting empirical evidence which shows that litigating
attorneys believe that federal judges rein injury bias against out-of-state litigants more than
state judges); David L. Shapiro, FederalDiversity Jurisdiction:A Survey and a Proposal,91 HARV.
L. REV. 317, 330 (1977). But see HENRYJ. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION: A GENERAL VIEW
148 (1973) ("[Tihe aid a federal court can give in avoiding prejudice against an otut-ofstater at least in jury cases is exceedingly limited."); id. at 149 (questioning whether the
possibility that federal judges are better able to control jury bias against out-of-state residents is adequate justification for preserving federal diversity jurisdiction); Larry Kramer,
DiversityJurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 120-21 (same) (citing FRIENDLY, supra, at 149).
274
Cf. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 357-59 (1816) (finding that
the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction to review opinions of a state high court, even
where the state court's opinion purports to rest solely on state law grounds, to determine
whether the state court structured its decision deliberately to avoid a federal law issue in an
effort to insulate its decision from Supreme Court review, and finding that otherwise, Su-
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Many states provide for the election of judges on their high courts. 275
Like other politicians, elected judges must concern themselves with
campaign fundraising and garnering votes. 27 6 Thus, they are prone to
27 7
allow the interests of their constituents to influence their decisions.
As such, elected judges are likely more prone to engage in bias against
out-of-state interests. 2"78

Though it may be the case that state trial

preme Court review "may be evaded at pleasure," id. at 357); FALLON ET AL., supra note 43,
at 495-99 (explaining that Martin reviewed an opinion by Virginia's high court on remand
from, yet in defiance of, an earlier Supreme Court opinion, and that the state court was
dominated by a "political enemy" of then-ChiefJustice John Marshall who had an interest
in the outcome of Martin (citing 4 ALBERTJ. BVEWRIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 146,

149-55 (1919)); Kevin R. Johnson, Why AlienageJurisdiction?:HistoricalFoundations and ModernJustificationsfjbr
FederalJurisdictionover Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1,
47 (1996) ("In [Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)], the
foreign defendant claimed that the Texas Supreme Court applied a more liberal test of
personal jurisdiction because the company was foreign. Thus, the concern was not simply
antiforeign sentiment by the jury but bias in the highest court of a state." (footnote
omitted)).
275 SeeJohn B. Wefing, State Supreme CourtJustices: Who Are They?, 32 NEw ENG. L. REV.
49, 55 (1997) ("All but nine states include some form of electoral process as part of the
selection of their state supreme court justices." (footnote omitted)). Even if states do not
mandate contested election ofjudges on their high courts, many require selection of high
court judges from a pool of judges who at some point were elected to office. See Gerald F.
Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State Supreme Courts in an
Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1997) ("The justices of
supreme courts in twenty-three states face contested elections at some stage in their career." (footnote omitted)). See generally Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, fudges and
the Politics of Death: DecidingBetween the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75
B.U. L. REV. 759, 776-81 (1995) (detailing various state judicial selection systems).
276 Richard Hasen explains:
Elected judges are in many ways indistinguishable from other politicians.
In jurisdictions holding partisan judicial elections, judges must gain the
party's nomination, and often seek the local party's endorsement. In both
partisan and [non]partisan elections, judges (or their surrogates) often
must solicit campaign contributions and run a campaign. Even judges
standing for retention elections sometimes must raise large sums to support
retention. Although ethical canons restrict campaigning by judicial candidates in some significant ways, judicial elections otherwise resemble contests for elected office. Even judges running unopposed in retention
elections must garner at least 50% of the vote; in Illinois retention elections, judges must garner 60% of the vote.
Richard L. Hasen, "High Court Wrongly Elected": A Public Choice Model ofJudging and Its Implicationsfor the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1313-1314 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
277 See, e.g., Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme
Courts, 54J. POL. 427, 438-40, 442-43 (1992) (analyzing data, and concluding that judicial
elections impact the voting records on controversial issues of otherwise liberal justices on
state supreme courts).
278

See RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS 62 (1988)

("At least in the states

where judges are directly elected by popular vote .... it should be obvious that the in-state
local plaintiff, his witnesses, and his friends, can all vote for the judge, while the out-of-state
defendant can't even be relied upon to send a campaign contribution."); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation ofJudicialBusiness Between State and Federal Courts: FederalJurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles", 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1801 (1992) ("[S]tate judges are
usually elected and, therefore, are generally more directly tied to the community than are
their federal counterparts. As a result, the possibility of prejudice in favor of powerful or
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court judges tend to be more parochial in outlook than state appellate
court judges2 79 studies have shown that elections for positions on
state high courts tend to be especially politicized, with large amounts
of money expended. 280 The amount of money and attention lavished
on elections for a state's highest court, as compared to lower courts, at
least suggests that judges on the state's highest court enjoy more discretion and are more likely to be called upon to make policy decisions
than are judges on lower state courts. Thus, judges on a state's highest court are likely to have greater leeway to incorporate bias (sub rosa,
of course) into their decisionmaking, including cases with out-of-state
litigants.
Third, the assumption that bias against out-of-state litigants can
occur only in factfinding is unwarranted. To the contrary, "it must be
important in-state interests is at least more than fanciful." (footnote omitted)); Roy A.
Schotland,Judicial-SelectionProcess Affects Diversity, NAT'L L.J., May 9, 1988, at 12 ("[T]here is
no denying that if there are [judicial] elections there often will be campaigns, and if there
is a campaign there must be campaign funds-and where do people expect such funds
come from? Surely not from out-of-staters."); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court
Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157 (1999) (noting that
"[r]edistributing wealth from out-of-state defendants to in-state plaintiffs is [an elected]
judge's way of providing constituency service," id. at 158, positing that "[t]he median voter
•.. is likely to support judges who redistribute income to in-state plaintiffs," id. at 159, and
finding "strong [empirical] evidence that in cases with out-of-state defendants[,] awards
are much higher in [states where judges are elected in partisan elections] than in other
types of judicial systems," id. at 186).
279
Cf Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (arguing that
state trial judges are less likely to be favorable to claimed violations of federal rights than
are federal judges).
Neuborne's analysis focuses on the lack of parity between federal trial judges and their
state counterparts. He concedes that, "[w]hen comparing federal district and state appellate courts, the comparative advantage which exists at the trial level is substantially diminished." Id. at 1116 n.45. Still, he ultimately remains "incline[d] ... toward a federal trial
forum" over a state appellate court. Id. In contrast, Paul Bator is "doubtful" of the proposition that federal judges are superior to state high court judges. Paul M. Bator, The State
Courts and Federal ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 630 (1981); see id. at
630-31; see also FRIENDLY, supra note 273, at 147 ("At all times in the country's history, it has
had state appellate judges of a stature altogether comparable to those on the federal
bench." (footnote omitted)).
280
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in
Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTrEMP. PROBS. 79, 110-13 (1998); Scott D. Wiener, Note,
PopularJustice: State Judicial Elections and ProceduralDue Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
187, 192-202 (1996). The large amounts of money expended on judicial elections may
have a deleterious effect on public confidence in the judiciary. See Poll: Confidence inJudiciary Eroded by Judges' Need to Raise Campaign Money (Aug. 12, 2002), available at http://www.
manningproductions.com/ABA245/OMK/release.html (last visited June 23, 2003), noting
that
[t]he American Bar Association today released results of a poll that shows
public trust and confidence in the judiciary is eroded by skyrocketing costs
in judicial election campaigns. According to the poll ....
72 percent of
Americans are concerned that the impartiality ofjudges is compromised by
their need to raise campaign money. Thirty-five percent of the respondents
said they were "extremely" or "very" concerned.
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supposed that, in making . . . jurisdictional grants, Congress acted
upon assumptions about institutional disparities between state and
federal courts for resolving not just questions of fact, but questions of
law and issues of law-applicationas well." 28 1 Further, the suggestion that
certification calls upon state courts only to answer questions of law is
itself inaccurate. The certification setting hardly precludes state high
courts from engaging in bias against out-of-state litigants. In their
casebook on administrative law, Justice Breyer, Richard Stewart, Cass
Sunstein, and Matthew Spitzer defend the promulgation of regulations by administrative agencies on the ground that regulations are
general in nature and the agencies that promulgate them cannot be
sure how they will apply in particular settings. 282 While one might try
to import this argument to the resolution of certified questions by
state courts, the analogy fails. 28 3 Unlike an agency issuing a general
regulation, a state court responds to a certified question in the context of a particular factual dispute between particular parties. Attorneys for the parties submit briefs to and present arguments before the
state court. 284 Moreover, state courts refuse to answer certified questions in the absence of a suitably developed factual record. 28 5 Even if
a state court answering a certified question does not have the power
actually to apply the rule it announces to the parties to the dispute, it
certainly is aware enough of the identity of the parties and the nature
of the dispute to predict how the certifying federal court will apply
that rule. The state court often will have enough information to structure, if it so chooses, its answer in a way that will bring about a predictable result in the dispute actually before the federal court. Thus,
despite the impression that the common terminology "certification of
questions of law" conveys, state courts responding to certified questions do not simply decide abstract questions of law in a vacuum. 286
281
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 223, at 655 (emphasis added). But see GOLDSCHMIDT, sulra note 105, at 61 ("Circuit judges (96%), district judges (95%), and state
justices (96%) overwhelmingly disagree that certified questions should not be sent to another court because that court 'may be biased on the question.'").
282 Specifically, they argue that,
when rules are general and formulated by officials who may find it difficult
to estimate how their own interests will be affected by the disposition of
particular cases, there is a greater likelihood that the policies adopted will
more nearly reflect a broad social judgment about desirable policy than the
officials' own private advantage.
STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LIM AND REGULATORY POuc:v 33 (4th ed. 1999).

283

See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 223, at 678-79.

284

See supra note 81 and accompanying text.

285

See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 7 P.3d 795, 802-03 (Wash. 2000) ("In
answering federal certified questions, we do not seek to make broad statements outside of
the narrow questions and record before us." (citation omitted)).
286
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A state high court often can phrase its answer to a certified question generally and still retain the ability to fashion a legal regime that
in effect is biased against out-of-state litigants. Specifically, in preparing an answer to a certified question, a state high court can announce
a general rule that, when applied to the actual dispute pending in the
federal forum, achieves a result unfavorable to the out-of-state litigant. 2 7 Then, in later cases where in-state litigants sit in the same
position as the out-of-state litigant did in the certified question case,
the state court legitimately might distinguish the answer to the certified question on its facts and conclude that what had seemed to be a
rule of general application (the answer to the certified question) was
in fact simply a rule that applied in the particular circumstances of
that case. As Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins observe, "the risk
of bias against a nonresident in the interpretation of untested state
law may be even greater than in cases of routine law application to
disputed facts." 28 Indeed, "the obscurity of state law furnishes a
2 9
unique opportunity for undetectable implementation of bias."
Illustrative in this regard are the opinions of the Texas Supreme
Court in Lucas v. United States29° and Rose v. Doctors Hospital.29 1 Lucas
involved a medical malpractice claim brought by the parents of a child
in federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 29 2 The parents

claimed that their child had suffered permanent injury resulting from
the malpractice of doctors at an army hospital. After a trial, the district court awarded damages to the plaintiffs.2 93 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided that a
Texas statutory scheme that limited recoverable damages in civil medical malpractice cases was applicable and consistent with both the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. 294 The federal court of appeals certified to the Texas Supreme

Court the question of "[w]hether the [statutory] limitation on medical malpractice damages ...

is consistent with the Texas Constitution

"295

The Texas Supreme Court answered the certified question in the
negative, concluding that the statutory scheme unreasonably and arbi287

See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 223, at 679 (noting "the obviousness of who

would stand immediately to benefit from the state-court ruling on unclear state law").
288
Id. at 677.
289 David P. Currie, The FederalCourts and the American Law Institute (Part11), 36 U. CHI.
L. REv. 268, 314 (1969). SeeWoolhandler & Collins, supra note 223, at 677 n.251 (asserting
that, in making this comment, Currie "got it exactly right").
290
757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
291
801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990).
292
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2000).
293
See Lucas v. United States, 811 F.2d 270, 271 (5th Cir. 1987).
294
Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 416-22 (5th Cir. 1986).
295
811 F.2d at 271.
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trarily limited the right of plaintiffs to pursue legal redress in violation
of the "open courts" guarantee of the Texas Constitution. 29 6 At one
point in its opinion, the court suggested that its analysis and holding
might be limited, stating, "we ...conclude that the liability limits...
are unconstitutional as applied to catastrophically damaged malpractice victims seeking a 'remedy by due course of law.' "297 Still, the court stated its
response to the certified question broadly: "[0] ur answer to the certified question is that the [statutory] limitation on medical malpractice
damages... is inconsistent with and violative of article I, section 13, of
the Texas Constitution."

'211

Two years later, in Rose, the Texas Supreme Court considered an
appeal in a wrongful death case brought by the spouse and parents of
a decedent against a hospital in Texas. 299 Writing before the issuance
of the supreme court's opinion in Lucas, the state court of appeals
held that the statutory scheme limiting civil medical malpractice
awards was consistent with the state constitution.""" On appeal, the
state supreme court affirmed the court of appeals on this issue.3 "'
The supreme court distinguished its earlier opinion in Lucas on the
ground that the malpractice claim therein existed at common law,
while the wrongful death claim pressed in Rose was of statutory origin.3t 12 The court reasoned that the Texas Constitution's "open
courts" provision protected common law, but not statutory, claims.
The court explained that, as a result, its holding in Lucas "did not
extend to wrongful death actions."3 "3- The court defended its distinction on the ground that the court rule that authorized the court to
respond to certified questions allowed it to do so "only as long as
'there are involved in the proceedings before the certifying court

questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause
then pending.' "14 The court proceeded to explain:
Under that rule, we did not decide.., that the limitation on wrongful death-rather than medical malpractice-damages-is inconsistent with the Texas Constitution. To do so would have been to
decide a "cause not then pending before the certifying court," a
cause involving wrongful death rather than common law medical
, ,
malpractice. 0
296

Lucas, 807 F.2d at 416.

297

757

298

Id. at 692.

S.W.2d

at 690 (emphasis added; quoting TEX. CoNs-r., art. I, § 13).

299 Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. 1990).
Rose v. Doctors Hosp. Facilities, 735 S.W.2d 244, 249 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), affd in
3oo
part and revd in unrelated part, 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990).
301
801 S.W.2d at 848.
'32 See id. at 843-45.
303
Id. at 842.
"14 Id. at 844 (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 114(a)).
305 Id.
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Thus, the supreme court retroactively converted what seemed to be a
broad response to a legal question into a holding limited to the facts
of the particular case before it. Indeed, the dissenting opinions in
Rose took the majority to task on precisely this ground. One dissenter
assailed the majority for limiting the scope of Lucas:
The court concludes today that the ... question posed in Lucas was
not "determinative of the cause then pending" because it could
have been framed more narrowly. I agree that the question could
have been asked differently, but I strongly disagree that it had to be.
Our answer to the question as posed was sufficient to enable the
federal court to apply state law in deciding the case before it. That
a narrower question would also have been determinative does not
deprive us of the authority to answer the question as asked, nor does
it deprive our response of precedential value. If no answer to a certified question can have precedential value if the question could
have been framed with greater specificity or precision, our decisions
in such cases will be of little use beyond the federal case in which
30 6
our assistance was invoked.
Another dissenting opinion described the majority's action in "distinguish [ing] our holding in Lucas on the basis that it arose in answer to
a certified question from a federal appellate court" as "erod[ing] our
30 7
authority to answer certified questions."
In short, while certification provides a setting that may ameliorate
the likelihood of bias, the potential for bias nonetheless persists. Of
course, the foregoing discussion by no means establishes that the Texas
Supreme Court acted as it did in order to bias the out-of-state litigant.
Still, the perception that the court engaged in bias is not unreasonable. Moreover, fear and perception of bias, and not merely actual
bias, are motivations for diversity jurisdiction.3 0 8 Even if bias is empirically minimized in certification cases, the discussion above demonstrates that fear and perception of bias reasonably can remain when
federal courts certify questions to state courts. Thus, the preclusion of
Id. at 849-50 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 856-57 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
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SeeJohn P. Frank, The Case for DiversityJurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 403, 406
(1979) ("The need [for the federal diversity jurisdiction] arose from a fear of prejudice
against out-of-staters engaged in regional business" that "was largely a gloomy anticipation
of things to come rather than an experienced evil .... "); Adrienne J. Marsh, Diversity
Jurisdiction: Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOK. L. REv. 197, 204 (1982)
("[A]ttempts to focus on the extent of empirical evidence showing prejudice against outof-state litigants is misplaced, since fear of prejudice can be as potent as actual bias itself."
(footnote omitted)); Douglas D. McFarland, DiversityJurisdiction: Is Local Prudice Feared?,
LITIGATION, Fall 1980, at 38, 55-56; Shapiro, supra note 273, at 330-32. See also Friendly,
supra note 223, at 493-97 (presenting a limited review of early U.S. state court decisions,
and concluding that "there was little cause to fear that the state tribunals would be hostile
to litigants from other states," id. at 497, although also conceding that "[i]t is, of course,
impossible to obtain accurate information on this subject," id. at 493).
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the certification of questions of law to state courts, solely on the
ground that state law is unclear, vindicates the policies underlying the
congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction.
The foregoing makes it clear that, assuming state high courts
sometimes discriminate against out-of-state residents, the rule of Meredith as a policy matter ought not to be overturned. If one is of opinion
that state courts' penchant to discriminate against out-of-state residents justifies the continued existence of the federal diversity jurisdiction, then, as Meredith holds and its reasoning makes abundantly
clear, the set of diversity cases in which federal courts might be justified in relinquishing jurisdiction to state courts should be severely circumscribed. Absent extenuating circumstances, pure diversity cases
properly brought before a federal forum should be heard entirely in
that forum. That being the case, a change to the law that would alter
Meredith, or an interpretation of Meredith that would shield certification from its holding, would inadvisably eviscerate federal diversity jurisdiction. The expansion of certification beyond the scope of
Pullman abstention to diversity cases is at odds with federal diversity
jurisdiction and-assuming that federal diversity jurisdiction itself is
desirable-would be a mistake. At most, certification should be available in cases in which Pullman abstention is also available, and in those
few cases in which Pullman abstention would be available but for the
fact that the likelihood of excessive delay and cost precludes invocation of that extensive procedure. In other cases, specifically pure diversity cases, certification should be, like Pullman abstention,
unavailable.
CONCLUSION

Certification may offer great benefits to the federal and state judicial systems, as well as to litigants. These benefits are not, however, a
sufficient base on which to rest jurisdiction.3 °19 Neither should the fact
that certification is an accepted part of the judicial landscape immunize the procedure from judicial scrutiny. 3 11This Article has argued
that, indeed, despite the many apparent benefits certification has provided during its four decades of use, the procedure raises serious
309
Cf Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988) ("[A]
court may not in any case, even in the interest ofjustice, extend its jurisdiction where none

exists .
•
See Selya, supra note 20, at 678 (noting that certification is so entrenched in our
,jurisprudence as to have become a judicial "sacred cow," but proceeding nonetheless to
examine and question the propriety of the procedure); cf Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (concluding that the constitutional nature of the infirmity of the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), "compel[led]" the Court to re-examine and ultimately to abandon the doctrine, even though the doctrine had been "so
widely applied throughout nearly a century").
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questions of federal jurisdiction that have, to date, not been examined
by the courts.
This Article has demonstrated the weakness inherent in certification's jurisdictional underpinnings and the ramifications of that weakness. Certification, alone among procedural settings and devices,
appears to be amenable to both the binary and unitary conceptions.
Moreover, to gird certification against constitutional challenge requires reliance upon the binary conception, while the unitary conception provides the best defense of certification against challenge under
the diversity statute.
However, the two conceptions cannot apply to the same procedural device or setting. Accordingly, certification can be defended, if at
all, uniformly under the binary conception. And even under the current state of the law, application of the binary conception to certification has ramifications. First, certification should be seen as a form of
abstention. This, at least in theory, affords state courts greater latitude when they respond to certified questions. Second, the binary
conception limits prospects for certification's expansion.
More fundamentally, however, because it cannot be gainsaid that
state high courts are unlikely to engage in bias against out-of-state residents when responding to certified questions, the binary conception
of certification conflicts with the fundamental purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction: to afford out-of-state litigants the opportunity to
have cases heard in a court more likely to be neutral than a state
court. As such, the propriety of the procedure in pure diversity cases
is highly questionable, as is the prospect of expanded use of certification in diversity cases looming on the horizon.

